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Home › Arbitration: Section 37 Appeals
Delhi High Court · 18 November 2026

Plausible Is Enough: The Delhi High Court on Appeals Against Section 17 Interim Orders

In Wapcos Ltd v. M P Khaitan (ARB. A. (COMM.) 39/2026, decided 18 November 2026), Justice Tushar Rao Gedela dismissed a challenge to a sole arbitrator’s interim order directing foreclosure of a construction contract, holding the tribunal’s view plausible and interference under Section 37(2)(b) unwarranted.

Appeals against interim orders of arbitral tribunals occupy a narrow shelf: the appellate court asks only whether the order is perverse, not whether it would have made the same call. In Wapcos Ltd v. M P Khaitan & Anr (ARB. A. (COMM.) 39/2026 & I.A. 13700/2026, reserved 3 November and decided 18 November 2026), the Delhi High Court applied that discipline to a dispute over a Convention Centre project at Aizawl, Mizoram, and dismissed the executing agency’s appeal under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — without costs.

How the matter reached the Court

The contractor’s Section 9 petition (O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 538/2025) became the vehicle for reference: on 24 December 2025 the disputes went to arbitration, the petition was directed to be treated as an application under Section 17 before the tribunal, and the Ministry of Tourism was impleaded. The sole arbitrator’s order of 16 April 2026 then did three things Wapcos found objectionable — removed the Ministry from the array, directed foreclosure with a certificate to that effect, and permitted the contractor to demobilise its plant and machinery.

The appellant’s two attacks

Only we may foreclose. Clause 13 of the General Conditions of Contract vests the power of foreclosure in Wapcos; the tribunal could not hand the contractor an exit the contract reserved to the employer’s side.
The Ministry had to stay. As the project owner funding the work, the Ministry of Tourism was a necessary party, and its deletion left the reference incomplete.

Why both failed

On Clause 13, the Court accepted that the clause “does empower the appellant to foreclose the contract/project” — but found nothing in it that proscribes the contractor from seeking foreclosure. Reading the contract with Sections 51 and 53 to 55 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (reciprocal promises and the consequences of preventing performance), the contractor who had completed about 90% of the work and then faced payment default was not disentitled from requiring the contract to be foreclosed. The Court further noted that the Clause 13 point appeared to have been raised for the first time in appeal, never before the tribunal, and that the direction to issue a foreclosure certificate was merely consequential.

On the Ministry’s deletion, the Court observed that the Ministry was undeniably not a signatory to the contract between Wapcos and the contractor, and that whether Clause 2(6) could bind a non-signatory was prima facie doubtful. The tribunal’s reasoning was neither perverse nor patently illegal, and Wapcos had not even contended that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed without costs.

The working rule for interim-order appeals

Raise it before the tribunal first. A contractual clause not urged before the arbitrator is a weak foundation for a Section 37(2)(b) appeal.
Perversity, not preference. The appellate court will not substitute its reading of the contract for a plausible tribunal view — the test mirrors award-stage review.
Interim means interim. Findings at the Section 17 stage are prima facie; the merits of accounts, delay and default remain open in the main reference.

For parties to government-linked construction contracts, the judgment is a reminder that suspension of work over payment defaults, followed by a Section 17 application, can produce a practically irreversible foreclosure long before any award — and that the appellate window against such orders is deliberately narrow.

This article reports a judgment of the High Court of Delhi for general information only. It is not legal advice and does not comment on any pending proceeding.

Frequently Asked Questions

What was the dispute?

The Ministry of Tourism appointed Wapcos as executing agency for a Convention Centre at Aizawl; contractor M P Khaitan signed the agreement dated 13 April 2022 with a 15-month completion period. About 90% of the work was done when payment disputes led the contractor to suspend work from 27 August 2024. A Section 9 petition was converted: on 24 December 2025 the parties were referred to arbitration and the petition was treated as a Section 17 application.

What had the arbitrator ordered?

By an interim order of 16 April 2026, the sole arbitrator deleted the Ministry of Tourism as a party, directed Wapcos to issue a foreclosure certificate and take over the site, and allowed the contractor to remove its plant and machinery. Wapcos appealed, arguing that only it could foreclose under Clause 13 of the GCC and that the Ministry was a necessary party.

Why did the Clause 13 argument fail?

The Court held that Clause 13 empowers Wapcos to foreclose but contains no clause proscribing the contractor from seeking that course; read with Sections 51 and 53 to 55 of the Contract Act, the contractor was not precluded from requiring foreclosure. The Court also noted the clause was apparently never urged before the tribunal, and the foreclosure certificate direction was simply consequential.

What standard governs Section 37(2)(b) appeals?

Interference is reserved for interim orders that are perverse or patently illegal. The Court found the tribunal had examined the inter-party correspondence before concluding foreclosure was justified, called its view plausible, and declined to reappraise it — the same restraint that governs Section 34 and Section 37 review of final awards, applied at the interim stage.

Note: This article is general information about the law and is not legal advice. It does not create an advocate-client relationship. The position stated is as at 20 November 2026 and may have changed since. Readers should verify any provision or decision referred to against the official text and seek advice on their own circumstances.