A criminal appeal admitted in 2015, arising from an incident of 2009, ended on 25 September 2026 with an acquittal. The judgment of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar is significant beyond its facts: it addresses how courts must treat a sole testimony that the trial court itself has partly disbelieved, and it illustrates the Supreme Court’s willingness under Article 136 to re-examine concurrent findings where the conviction rests on internally inconsistent reasoning.
The seventeen-year arc
The FIR of June 2009 alleged that the appellant took the prosecutrix, said to be a schoolgirl, from Ludhiana and kept her at Malerkotla over several days, invoking Sections 363, 366A and 376 IPC. The Sessions Court found the prosecutrix was in fact about nineteen years old and had accompanied the appellant voluntarily — acquitting him of the abduction charge — but convicted him of rape and imposed ten years’ rigorous imprisonment. The High Court affirmed. The appeal, admitted in 2015 as Criminal Appeal No. 203 of 2015, was finally heard and allowed on 25 September 2026.
The core of the reasoning
No cherry-picking a sole account
The prosecution’s case stood on the prosecutrix’s testimony. Having disbelieved it on the voluntariness question for Section 366, the courts could not turn around and rest a Section 376 conviction on the very same account of the very same days.
Conduct evidence mattered
The prosecutrix moved through bazaars, intersections and public transport without raising alarm or attempting to leave — conduct the Court found difficult to reconcile with the allegation of forcible confinement and assault.
Forensics without foundation prove little
Spermatozoa on medical examination establishes intercourse, not its non-consensual character; with no injuries recorded and the testimony impeached, the forensic finding could not carry the conviction alone.
The Court’s closing theme deserves emphasis: convictions must rest on “hard evidence,” not on judicial value judgments about how a complainant or an accused ought to have behaved. That discipline protects the integrity of genuine prosecutions as much as it protects the innocent.
Article 136 and concurrent findings
| General rule | Recognised exceptions |
|---|---|
| The Supreme Court does not reappreciate evidence behind concurrent findings of fact | Perverse or internally contradictory reasoning; misreading of evidence; findings resting on inadmissible material; violation of settled legal standards |
This case fell within the exceptions because the contradiction was structural: the same evidentiary foundation was treated as false for one offence and true for another. Where that happens, interference in an appeal by special leave is not indulgence — it is error correction of the kind Article 136 exists for.
Takeaways for practice
The judgment realigns an old truth of criminal adjudication: testimony is evaluated as a whole, against the record as a whole. Partial belief, deployed selectively to sustain the gravest charge, cannot survive appellate scrutiny.
This article is for general information only and is not legal advice. Criminal appeals turn on their complete record; parties should obtain advice on their own matter.
Frequently Asked Questions
What were the courts below’s findings?
The Sessions Court acquitted the accused of the Section 366 IPC charge, finding the prosecutrix was an adult who accompanied him voluntarily — yet convicted him under Section 376 IPC on her testimony, medical evidence of spermatozoa and the last-seen circumstance, sentencing him to ten years. The High Court affirmed, invoking the consent presumption in Section 114A of the Evidence Act.
Why did the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings?
Because the reasoning was self-contradictory: the same testimony was rejected for one charge and accepted for another arising from the same transaction. The Court held there cannot be partial rejection and partial acceptance of the prosecutrix’s evidence in such circumstances, and that a conviction must rest on hard evidence, not value judgments.
What other factors weighed in the acquittal?
The testimony contained material contradictions, including about the return journey; the prosecutrix travelled through crowded public places without protest or attempt to escape; and the medical examination recorded no injuries. The presence of spermatozoa, without credible evidence of non-consent, could not sustain the conviction.
Does the judgment weaken the evidentiary value of a prosecutrix’s testimony?
No. A conviction can rest on the sole testimony of a prosecutrix where it inspires confidence. The judgment addresses the different situation where the courts below themselves found the testimony unreliable in part — at that point, consistency demands a unified assessment.