POCSO appeals are frequently won and lost on three questions: can the child’s testimony stand on its own, was the complaint made without suspicious delay, and is there anything the defence can offer beyond a bare suggestion of enmity? The Madurai Bench’s judgment of 12 November 2026 in A. Muthupandi v. State of Tamil Nadu (Crl.A.(MD) No. 246 of 2025) answers all three against the appellant, and in doing so restates the settled architecture of child-victim evidence law.
The prosecution case
The incident occurred on 26 October 2023 at about 7 p.m., when the appellant was alleged to have sexually assaulted a ten-year-old girl. A child helpline call was made the same night, and the first information report was registered the next day at Devadhanapatti Police Station, District Theni (Crime No. 411 of 2023). The trial court — in Spl.S.C. No. 17 of 2024 — framed a charge under Section 9(m) read with Section 10 of the POCSO Act, examined seventeen witnesses, marked eleven exhibits, and convicted the appellant under Section 10, sentencing him to five years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 10,000.
The appeal, filed under Section 415(2) of the BNSS, came before Hon’ble Mr. Justice D. Lingeswaran, who dismissed it on 12 November 2026 and confirmed both conviction and sentence.
The four findings that decided the appeal
The sentencing point: statutory minimums are floors, not suggestions
Perhaps the most practically significant paragraph is the last: the Court held that it could not reduce the sentence below the five-year minimum that Section 10 prescribes. POCSO’s sentencing scheme is built on legislatively fixed minimums precisely to remove the discretion that produced wildly divergent outcomes in child sexual assault cases. Appellate arguments about the appellant’s age, family circumstances or the time elapsed since the offence can operate within the statutory range, never below it.
Reading the case alongside the settled law
The judgment applies, rather than extends, the Supreme Court’s framework. Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573, settled that a survivor’s sole testimony, if it inspires confidence, needs no corroboration as a matter of law. The prompt-complaint principle, anchored in Section 8, Illustration (j) of the Evidence Act, treats the immediacy of disclosure as conduct consistent with the truth of the accusation. Where, as here, both planks are present and an independent eyewitness stands with the child, an appellate court has little room to interfere — its jurisdiction is to correct error, not to re-live the trial.
One structural note for practitioners: the charge was framed under Section 9(m) read with Section 10 (aggravated sexual assault on a child below twelve), and the conviction was recorded under Section 10. Defence counsel examining such records should always verify that the charge, the findings and the conviction provision align, since misalignment can itself furnish a ground of appeal — though none was found material here.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a conviction rest on the child victim’s testimony alone?
Yes. The Court applied Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573, which holds that the sole testimony of the survivor can sustain a conviction if it is trustworthy, reliable and inspires confidence. Corroboration is a matter of prudence, not an invariable legal requirement.
Why did the timing of the complaint matter?
A complaint made immediately after the event is relevant conduct under Section 8, Illustration (j) of the Evidence Act. Here a child helpline call was made the same night and the FIR was lodged the next day; the Court found no delay significant enough to breed doubt, noting the father’s absence as context.
Could the Court have reduced the five-year sentence?
No. Section 10 of the POCSO Act prescribes a minimum of five years for aggravated sexual assault, and the Court held it had no power to go below the statutory minimum. Sympathy cannot rewrite a legislatively fixed floor.
What was the defence and why did it fail?
The appellant pleaded false implication arising from enmity over an alleged illicit relationship, and alternatively that he had merely pushed the child. Both failed: the victim and an independent eyewitness consistently described the assault, and the alternative plea contradicted the primary defence.