In Sayed Khalid Ali v. Arshi (Criminal Appeal No. 78/2025, decided 2 November 2026), the Court of Ms. Shilpi Jain, Additional Sessions Judge-02, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, dismissed a husband’s appeal against an order refusing him a direction, sought within his wife’s proceedings under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, that she not obstruct his re-entry into the rented one-room shared household. The court held that the DV Act does not contemplate reliefs in favour of the respondent at all.
The case in one view
| Case | Sayed Khalid Ali v. Arshi, Criminal Appeal No. 78/2025 |
|---|---|
| Court | Ms. Shilpi Jain, Additional Sessions Judge-02, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi |
| Decided | 2 November 2026 |
| Provision | Appeal under Section 29, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 |
| Outcome | Appeal dismissed; Magistrate’s order of 7 February 2025 upheld |
The background
The parties were husband and wife who lived in a one-room rented house in Darya Ganj, Delhi. On 8 July 2023, the wife left for her parental home, and thereafter filed a complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act. On 28 August 2023, the Magistrate fixed interim maintenance of Rs 3,000 per month in her favour. A related FIR under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code also existed between the parties.
The husband then moved an application in the wife’s own DV proceedings, seeking a direction that she not obstruct his re-entry into the rented premises. He alleged that her family members had forcibly entered the house on 3 September 2023. The Magistrate dismissed that application on 7 February 2025, and the husband carried the matter to the Sessions Court under Section 29 of the Act.
Limitation: the Sunday rule
Before the merits, the court addressed limitation. The thirtieth day from the impugned order fell on a Sunday. Applying Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the court held the appeal filed on the next working day to be within time — a small but recurring point of practice in DV Act appeals, where the thirty-day window under Section 29 is short and often ends on a court holiday.
The right to reside does not lapse with absence
The substantive foundation of the decision is Section 17 of the DV Act. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Satish Chander Ahuja and Prabha Tyagi, the court reiterated that every woman in a domestic relationship has the right to reside in the shared household, and that this right does not depend on her actually residing there at any given moment. The wife’s departure to her parental home in July 2023 therefore did not dilute her statutory right in respect of the rented Darya Ganj premises.
No reliefs for the respondent in Section 12 proceedings
The appeal failed primarily on the architecture of the statute. The reliefs under the DV Act — protection orders under Section 18, residence orders under Section 19, monetary relief under Section 20, custody orders under Section 21 and compensation under Section 22 — are all framed as reliefs for the aggrieved person. The court put the point directly:
From the judgment: “The DV Act does not contemplate the grant of reliefs in favour of the respondent in the said proceedings.”
The court further held that the Magistrate’s refusal was in no way perverse, because a direction permitting the husband to reside in the premises would, in effect, operate to exclude the wife from the shared household — inverting the protective scheme of the Act. The disputed facts surrounding the alleged forcible entry of 3 September 2023 were left to be examined at trial.
What the decision means in practice
The wider frame
The decision sits within a settled line of authority on the one-directional character of DV Act reliefs. The statute was enacted to secure the civil protection of women facing domestic violence, and the definition of “aggrieved person” in Section 2(a) confines the claimant class to women in a domestic relationship. Respondents retain their ordinary remedies — civil suits for possession or injunction, and defences within the DV proceedings themselves — but they cannot obtain affirmative orders under Sections 18 to 22. For practitioners in Delhi’s district courts, the judgment is a clean, citable statement of that proposition at the appellate level, together with a useful application of the limitation rules for Section 29 appeals.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a husband ask for orders in his favour in the wife's DV Act case?
No. The court held that the scheme of Sections 18 to 22 of the DV Act contemplates reliefs only for the aggrieved person. In the words of the judgment, the DV Act does not contemplate the grant of reliefs in favour of the respondent in those proceedings. A respondent who claims independent rights in a property must pursue them in appropriately constituted separate proceedings.
Does the wife lose her right to reside if she has left the shared household?
No. Relying on the Supreme Court's rulings in Satish Chander Ahuja and Prabha Tyagi, the court reiterated that a woman's right to reside in the shared household under Section 17 does not depend on her actually living there full time. Her temporary absence, including a stay at her parental home, does not extinguish the right.
Was the appeal filed within limitation?
Yes. The thirtieth day after the Magistrate's order fell on a Sunday, and applying Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the filing on the next working day was treated as within time. The appeal was therefore decided on merits, not on the threshold of delay.
What happens to the disputed incident of forcible entry?
The husband alleged that the wife's family members forcibly entered the rented premises on 3 September 2023. The court did not decide that factual controversy. It held that disputed questions of fact of that nature are matters for trial, and they could not justify an interim direction that would in effect exclude the wife from the shared household.