In Navratan v. The State (NCT of Delhi) (CRL.A. 144/2021, decided 5 November 2026), Justice Madhu Jain of the Delhi High Court upheld a conviction under Section 6 read with Section 5(m) of the POCSO Act, 2012 for aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a girl of about eight years, while reducing the sentence from twenty years’ rigorous imprisonment to fifteen — because the offence of June 2016 predated the 2019 amendment that raised the minimum sentence to twenty years.
The case in one view
| Case | Navratan v. The State (NCT of Delhi), CRL.A. 144/2021 (with CRL.M.(BAIL) 348/2021) |
|---|---|
| Court | High Court of Delhi, Justice Madhu Jain |
| Decided | 5 November 2026 (reserved 28 October 2026) |
| Charge | Section 6 read with Section 5(m), POCSO Act, 2012 — aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a child below twelve |
| Outcome | Conviction affirmed; sentence reduced from 20 to 15 years’ RI; fine of Rs 10,000 and default term unchanged |
The facts
The appellant and the victim — a girl of about eight — were neighbours in the same building. The prosecution alleged that in June 2016 he committed penetrative sexual assault on her in his room. The matter came to light when the child’s mother noticed her pain while bathing her, and the family then reported it. The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and sentenced him to twenty years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs 10,000.
The conviction: core versus periphery
The appeal attacked the child’s testimony on familiar fronts — internal variations, delayed reporting, and the state of the medical and forensic record. The court’s analysis followed the settled architecture of POCSO appeals. Age below twelve was proved through the school record and the mother’s affidavit, anchoring Section 5(m). Variations in the child’s narrative about the events preceding the assault were held not to displace the consistent core allegation. The delay in reporting was explained by the circumstances of the disclosure. And the forensic silences — no fresh hymenal tear, no usable male DNA profile — were held consistent with the eleven-day gap before the medical examination. The court concluded: “The prosecution has established the charge under Section 6 of the POCSO Act beyond reasonable doubt”.
The false-implication theory: an alleged loan of Rs 20,000 was said to have motivated the case. The defence witness called to prove it could not establish any demand for repayment — and an unproved motive theory leaves the prosecution’s case untouched.
The sentence: Article 20(1) does its work
The decisive sentencing question was temporal. In June 2016, Section 6 POCSO prescribed rigorous imprisonment of not less than ten years, extendable to life. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 2019 later raised that minimum to twenty years where the victim is below twelve. The trial court’s twenty-year sentence tracked the amended provision — but the amendment postdated the offence. Article 20(1) of the Constitution forbids subjecting a person to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the offence. Holding the amended minimum inapplicable, the High Court re-sentenced within the pre-amendment range, fixing fifteen years’ rigorous imprisonment and leaving the fine and default sentence undisturbed.
Section 6 POCSO: minimum 10 years’ RI, extendable to imprisonment for life.
Minimum 20 years’ RI where the child is below twelve — prospective only; it cannot govern a 2016 offence.
Why the judgment matters
Trial courts sentencing in old POCSO cases must apply the sentencing range in force on the date of the offence, not the date of judgment — an error that recurs because POCSO trials often conclude many years after the incident. Appellate correction of that error does not signal leniency on the merits: here the conviction was affirmed in full, the child’s testimony vindicated, and only the constitutionally impermissible excess trimmed. The decision also restates, compactly, the evidentiary doctrine that governs this docket: the core of a child’s account controls; medical evidence corroborates but is not a precondition; delay explained is delay excused; and motive theories require proof, not suggestion.
For practitioners, the case pairs naturally with the same Bench’s affirmance, the same day, of a seven-year Section 10 sentence for a school van driver — together they map the two ends of the appellate function in POCSO matters: correcting legal error in sentence while protecting sound findings of fact.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why was the sentence reduced if the conviction was upheld?
Because of the prohibition on retrospective penalties. The offence occurred in June 2016, when Section 6 POCSO prescribed a minimum of ten years. The 2019 amendment raising the minimum to twenty years came later, and a heavier penalty than the one in force at the time of the offence cannot be applied. The court fixed fifteen years within the pre-amendment range.
Did inconsistencies in the child's account matter?
Variations in her narrative about the events preceding the assault did not displace the core allegation of penetrative assault, which remained consistent. Courts separate the periphery from the core: a child's imperfect recollection of surrounding details does not discredit a steady account of the act itself.
How did the court deal with the medical and DNA evidence?
The absence of a fresh hymenal tear and of a usable male DNA profile was held not to discredit the child's testimony, given the gap of eleven days between the incident and the medical examination. Medical evidence in such cases is corroborative, not indispensable, and its silence after a delay proves nothing either way.
What was the defence, and why did it fail?
False implication over an alleged loan of Rs 20,000. The defence witness examined to support it could not establish that any repayment demand was ever made, so the theory remained an assertion. The delay in reporting was separately held explained by the circumstances in which the child's condition came to light.