In Anuj @ Ambuz @ Chhavinder Kumar v. State NCT of Delhi (CRL.A. 5/2024, decided 5 November 2026), Justice Madhu Jain of the Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal of a school van driver convicted under Section 10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 for aggravated sexual assault on a ten-year-old passenger, affirming the sentence of seven years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine and victim compensation of Rs 3,00,000.
The case in one view
| Case | Anuj @ Ambuz @ Chhavinder Kumar v. State NCT of Delhi, CRL.A. 5/2024 |
|---|---|
| Court | High Court of Delhi, Justice Madhu Jain |
| Decided | 5 November 2026 (reserved 28 October 2026) |
| Below | FIR 114/2018, PS Mangolpuri; conviction under Section 10 POCSO by ASJ-01 (POCSO), Rohini — 7 years RI, Rs 20,000 fine, Rs 3,00,000 compensation |
| Outcome | Appeal dismissed; appellant directed to surrender within four weeks |
The prosecution case
The appellant drove the school van in which the child, then about ten years old and in Class V, travelled. On 14 February 2018, the prosecution alleged, he made her touch his penis on the pretext of teaching her to change gears, and threatened to kill her if she told anyone. She told her mother the same day, and the FIR was registered. The trial court convicted him under Section 10 of the POCSO Act (he was acquitted of the charge under Section 506 IPC) and imposed seven years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine and compensation.
The three pillars of the affirmance
The relationship of trust
The judgment’s most quotable line addresses the setting rather than the elements: “A school van driver is entrusted with the safety and well-being of children”, the court observed, likening the role to that of a parent. The observation matters for sentencing. Within the five-to-seven-year band of Section 10, the breach of a custodial relationship of trust justified the maximum, and the High Court declined to soften it. The compensation of Rs 3,00,000 under Section 33(8) of the Act read with Rule 9 of the POCSO Rules, 2020 was likewise maintained, as was the set-off under Section 428 CrPC.
What the decision reinforces
A note on the current law
The offence predates 1 July 2024, so the IPC and CrPC applied alongside the POCSO Act. For later offences, the procedural frame is the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and the general penal provisions are found in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — but the POCSO Act itself continues unchanged as the special statute, and with it the presumption under Section 29, the child-friendly trial procedure, and the compensation regime under the 2020 Rules.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a POCSO conviction rest on the child's testimony alone?
Yes. The court reiterated that the testimony of the victim, if found cogent, credible and trustworthy, can form the sole basis of conviction. Here the child's account was consistent on all material particulars and unshaken in cross-examination, and her immediate disclosure to her mother supplied additional assurance.
How was the victim's age proved?
Through the school admission form, the admission register and the MCD birth certificate, establishing her date of birth and an age of about ten years at the time of the offence — the route recognised in Ashwani Kumar Saxena, now codified for POCSO purposes through Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015.
What is the Section 29 POCSO presumption?
Once foundational facts are established, Section 29 presumes that the accused committed the offence charged under Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 of the Act, unless the contrary is proved. The appellant's defence of false implication over a van-fare dispute was unsupported by any evidence and was denied by the mother in cross-examination, so the presumption stood unrebutted.
Why was the offence \"aggravated\" sexual assault?
Section 9(m) elevates sexual assault to aggravated sexual assault when committed on a child below twelve years. The victim being about ten, the conviction fell under Section 10, which prescribes imprisonment of five to seven years. The trial court imposed the maximum seven years, and the High Court found no ground to interfere.