In Dr. Amrit Kejriwal v. Dr. Jaya Kejriwal (First Appeal No. 206 of 2018, neutral citation 2026:JHHC:32541-DB, decided 5 November 2026), a Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand — Chief Justice M.S. Sonak and Justice Manoj Prasad — dismissed a husband’s appeal against the Family Court’s refusal of divorce on grounds of cruelty and desertion under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Bench also directed the husband to deposit Rs 15 lakh for the minor daughter, without prejudice to any final maintenance claim.
The case in one view
| Case | Dr. Amrit Kejriwal v. Dr. Jaya Kejriwal, First Appeal No. 206 of 2018 |
|---|---|
| Court | High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, Division Bench (M.S. Sonak, C.J. and Manoj Prasad, J.) |
| Decided | 5 November 2026 (reserved 6 October 2026) · 2026:JHHC:32541-DB |
| Grounds pressed | Cruelty — Section 13(1)(i-a); Desertion — Section 13(1)(i-b), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 |
| Outcome | Appeal dismissed; Family Court decree affirmed; Rs 15 lakh deposit directed for the minor daughter |
The husband’s case
The husband sought dissolution of the marriage alleging rude conduct by the wife towards his family, cruelty, and that she had left the matrimonial home without any genuine effort to restore conjugal life. He pointed to the criminal complaint she had filed under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (Complaint No. 372 of 2008), which was later dismissed for non-filing of requisites, and claimed that his parents died of the shock of that litigation. The Family Court at Bokaro dismissed the suit in March 2018, finding neither cruelty nor desertion proved, and the husband appealed.
Cruelty: the complaint that proved nothing
The centrepiece of the cruelty case was the 498A complaint. The Bench’s answer is the sentence practitioners will quote: the mere filing of a complaint and its dismissal for non-filing of requisites does not amount to cruelty to the husband. A complaint dismissed on a procedural default has never been tested on merits; it is neither a finding of truth against the husband nor a finding of falsity against the wife. Without proof that the prosecution was false and malicious, the cruelty ground could not stand. The claim that the husband’s parents died of shock was found unsupported by any evidence.
A criminal case proved to be false and malicious — instituted to harass — as recognised in a consistent line of Supreme Court authority.
A complaint that ended on a procedural default, with no adjudication of falsity. Filing alone, without proof of malice, is not cruelty.
Desertion: the missing animus
The desertion ground fared no better, for three converging reasons. First, no date of desertion was specifically pleaded — a foundational defect, since the two-year statutory period under Section 13(1)(i-b) must be anchored somewhere. Second, the wife had, in her reply notice, categorically stated that she was still desirous of restoring conjugal life; animus deserendi, the settled intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end, was therefore absent. Third, the birth of the parties’ child in May 2007, shortly before the suit of June 2008, further negated the narrative of a marriage long abandoned.
The framework applied
On cruelty, the Bench worked within the Supreme Court’s established framework: the illustrative guidelines of Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, the context-sensitive standard of Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, the character-imputation principle of Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate, and Joydeep Majumdar on the cumulative effect of conduct. The through-line of these authorities is evidentiary: cruelty is established by proved conduct assessed in the setting of the particular marriage, not by the bare existence of litigation between spouses.
The protective coda
Having dismissed the appeal, the Bench did not leave the family’s economics untouched. Noting that reconciliation efforts had failed, it directed the husband to deposit Rs 15 lakh in an account in the minor daughter’s name, operable through her mother, without prejudice to any final maintenance claim — an application of the approach in Rajnesh v. Neha that the child’s support should not await the end of the parents’ litigation.
Takeaways for matrimonial practice
- A spouse relying on the other’s criminal complaint as cruelty must prove falsity or malice; a procedural dismissal proves neither.
- Desertion pleadings must specify the date of desertion and confront any expressed willingness to resume cohabitation.
- Appellate benches increasingly pair the dismissal of matrimonial appeals with concrete financial directions for children — disclosure under Rajnesh makes this routine.
- In Delhi, the same principles govern petitions under Section 13 HMA before the Family Courts, with appeals lying to the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is a wife's criminal complaint against the husband always cruelty?
No. Courts treat a false and malicious prosecution as mental cruelty, but the complaint must be shown to be false. Here the Section 498A complaint was dismissed for non-filing of requisites — a procedural end, not a finding of falsity — and the Bench held that the mere filing of a complaint and its dismissal on that ground does not amount to cruelty.
Why did the desertion ground fail?
Desertion requires both separation in fact and animus deserendi — the settled intention to abandon the marriage. No date of desertion was specifically pleaded, the wife had categorically stated in her reply notice that she wished to restore conjugal life, and a child was born in May 2007 shortly before the June 2008 suit. Together these negated the intention to desert.
What precedents did the court apply on cruelty?
The Bench applied the Supreme Court's guidelines in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, along with Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate and Joydeep Majumdar — the settled framework under which cruelty is assessed cumulatively, by the standards of the particular marriage, and on evidence rather than assertion.
What was the Rs 15 lakh deposit about?
Noting failed reconciliation efforts, the court directed the husband to deposit Rs 15 lakh in an account in the minor daughter's name, operable through her mother, expressly without prejudice to any final maintenance claim — applying the disclosure-and-support approach of Rajnesh v. Neha.