Article 136 of the Constitution is a discretionary jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court is slow to disturb concurrent findings of fact — slower still in cases involving offences against children. That is what makes the judgment delivered on 17 September 2026 in Deepak (In JC) v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 21271-72 of 2025, worth careful study. A bench of Justice N.V. Anjaria and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra allowed the appeals, set aside a conviction under Section 363 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act that the Delhi High Court had affirmed, and acquitted the appellant of a charge that had carried ten years of rigorous imprisonment.
The prosecution case
The allegation was grave and the alleged victim was very young — a girl of about two and a half years. The prosecution alleged that the appellant took the child to a nearby park; when she was brought back, her mother noticed blood on her clothing and reported an alleged sexual assault to the police. The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code (kidnapping) and Section 6 of the POCSO Act (aggravated penetrative sexual assault), sentencing him to ten years of rigorous imprisonment with fine. The High Court of Delhi dismissed his appeal and affirmed the conviction. The matter reached the Supreme Court by way of special leave.
What the Supreme Court found
On a close reading of the record, the bench found that the conviction could not stand. Three strands of the evidence, taken together, left the prosecution case short of the criminal standard.
Contradictory testimony
The witnesses materially contradicted one another on the timing and circumstances of the incident — the sequence of events on which the entire prosecution narrative depended did not hold together across the depositions.
Neutral medical record
The medical evidence and the FSL report did not support the specific charge: no semen or bloodstains connecting the appellant, no physical injuries consistent with the alleged penetrative assault, and a hymen found intact without abnormality.
Presumptions without foundation
Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act raise presumptions against the accused, but they presuppose that the prosecution first proves the foundational facts. Where the substratum itself is doubtful, the presumption cannot fill the gap.
The Court accordingly set aside the judgments of the courts below, acquitted the appellant, and directed his release forthwith unless he was required in connection with any other offence.
The presumption is a bridge, not a substitute
The most useful doctrinal takeaway lies in the treatment of the statutory presumptions. Section 29 presumes the commission of the offence once a person is prosecuted for the specified offences, and Section 30 presumes the culpable mental state. It has always been the position, repeatedly emphasised in POCSO jurisprudence, that these presumptions are triggered only when the prosecution lays a credible evidentiary foundation. A prosecution that fails to prove the foundational facts — the occurrence itself, the identity of the perpetrator, the circumstances that make the statutory offence out — cannot ask the presumption to do the work that its witnesses could not. This judgment applies that principle at the highest level, against the backdrop of concurrent convictions, which gives it particular persuasive force for trial and appellate courts.
Article 136 and concurrent findings
For practitioners advising on whether to carry a criminal appeal to the Supreme Court, the case is also a data point on the reach of Article 136. The Court does not sit as a routine third court of fact. But the jurisdiction exists precisely for cases where the process below has miscarried — where material contradictions were not confronted, where scientific evidence pointing away from guilt was not weighed, or where the benefit of reasonable doubt was withheld. A petition of special leave that can demonstrate this kind of structural infirmity in the appreciation of evidence, rather than merely re-arguing the record, stands on a different footing from the ordinary run of SLPs.
A note of balance
Nothing in the judgment dilutes the seriousness with which courts treat sexual offences against children, and nothing in it should be read as raising the bar for genuine prosecutions. The POCSO Act's architecture — special courts, child-friendly procedure, statutory presumptions — remains fully intact. What the decision reaffirms is the constant of criminal law that sits alongside that architecture: however grave the charge, the conviction must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt, established by the prosecution's own evidence. Where that proof fails, the presumption of innocence, reinforced rather than displaced in appeal, must prevail.
This article is for general information only and is not legal advice or a solicitation.
Frequently Asked Questions
Do Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act reverse the burden of proof entirely?
No. The presumptions operate only after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts of the offence through credible evidence. Where the testimony on those foundational facts is materially contradictory, or the medical and forensic record does not support the charge, the presumption has nothing to attach to and the accused cannot be convicted on the presumption alone.
When does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings under Article 136?
Sparingly. The Court does not reappreciate evidence as a routine third forum, but it will interfere where the findings are perverse, where material contradictions have been glossed over, or where the courts below convicted despite the prosecution failing to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This judgment is an illustration of that limited but real supervisory role.
What weight does medical and forensic evidence carry in POCSO trials?
It is not decisive by itself, but where the medical examination and the FSL report are inconsistent with the specific allegation of penetrative assault, and the ocular account is itself contradictory, the neutral scientific record becomes a powerful factor supporting the defence. Courts weigh the whole record together.
Does an acquittal in appeal mean immediate release?
Ordinarily yes. The Supreme Court directed that the appellant be released forthwith unless his custody was required in some other case. Bail bonds, if any, stand discharged on acquittal.