An appeal against acquittal is the steepest climb in criminal appellate practice. On 17 September 2026, a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi comprising Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Vikas Mahajan dismissed the State's appeal in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Rajender Singh, CRL.A. 461/2018, arising from a January 2005 incident in which a property dealer suffered three gunshot injuries at his shop. The trial court had acquitted both accused of offences under Sections 307, 452 and 34 IPC and the Arms Act; the High Court, re-examining a record of twenty-six witnesses, found the acquittal not merely a possible view but a persuasive one.
The occurrence and the trial
On 12 January 2005, a property dealer was shot at and injured — three gunshot wounds — at his shop in Delhi. Two assailants fled on a motorcycle, leaving behind a country-made pistol. Rajender Singh and a co-accused were arrested and tried under Sections 307 (attempt to murder), 452 (house-trespass after preparation for hurt) and 34 IPC, with allied charges under Sections 27, 54 and 59 of the Arms Act. The prosecution examined twenty-six witnesses, including the injured, two claimed eyewitnesses, and forensic experts. The trial court acquitted. The State appealed under the jurisdiction then found in Section 378 CrPC.
What the Division Bench found
A shifting injured-witness account
The injured party's testimony contained significant contradictions across his successive statements — on the very facts on which the identification of the assailants depended.
Identification that never firmed up
The claimed eyewitnesses could not definitively identify the accused as the assailants — leaving the prosecution without a reliable ocular foundation.
A forensic record with discrepancies
The forensic evidence showed inconsistencies suggesting potential manipulation of the record — the kind of infirmity that corrodes confidence in the investigation as a whole.
Applying the settled standard, the Bench held that the prosecution had failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, dismissed the appeal, affirmed the acquittal, and discharged the bail bonds.
The appellate standard, restated
The law on appeals against acquittal has been stable for decades. The appellate court has full power to re-appreciate the evidence — the record is open, nothing is immune. But the disposition of that power is constrained: if the trial court's view is a reasonably possible one, the acquittal stands even if the appellate court might itself have convicted on the same record. The justification is the double presumption of innocence — the constitutional presumption every accused carries, fortified by the acquittal itself. In practice, successful State appeals share a signature: a trial court judgment that ignored unimpeached evidence, misread the record, or applied a legally wrong test. An acquittal built on genuine contradictions and failed identification, as here, presents no such target.
The long tail of old cases
Twenty-one years separated the occurrence from the appellate judgment — a span in which memories fade, witnesses disperse and records age. Delays of this order are themselves a reason appellate courts hesitate to disturb acquittals: a retrial or a reversal decades later rests on evidence that time has already degraded. For complainants and victims, the practical lesson cuts at the investigation stage — identification must be secured early and by proper procedure (test identification parades, prompt statements), and forensic chains must be documented beyond the reach of later doubt. Once contradictions enter the record, no appellate court can conjure the missing certainty.
For practitioners
For the defence, the case illustrates the durable value of cross-examination that fixes contradictions on the record in the witness's own words — those contradictions outlast the trial and anchor the acquittal in appeal. For the State, it underlines that the decision to appeal an acquittal should follow a hard-headed audit of the record against the perversity standard, not the gravity of the original allegation. And for victims weighing their own appellate rights under Section 413 BNSS, an early, candid merits assessment saves years of litigation against the double presumption.
This article is for general information only and is not legal advice or a solicitation.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the "double presumption" in appeals against acquittal?
An accused enters trial presumed innocent; an acquittal reinforces that presumption with a judicial finding. An appellate court therefore interferes only where the trial court's view is perverse or impossible on the evidence — not merely because another view could reasonably have been taken.
Who can appeal against an acquittal?
The State may appeal with leave of the High Court; a complainant in a complaint case needs special leave; and a victim has a statutory right of appeal against acquittal under the proviso to Section 413 BNSS (formerly the proviso to Section 372 CrPC). Each route has its own limitation and leave requirements.
What kinds of infirmities justified acquittal here?
The injured witness's account shifted materially across his statements; the claimed eyewitnesses could not definitively identify the assailants; and the forensic record contained discrepancies suggesting the possibility of manipulation. Individually explainable, together they left the case short of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Does dismissal of the State's appeal end the matter?
The State may seek special leave before the Supreme Court under Article 136, but the double presumption travels with the record, and the Supreme Court interferes with concurrent acquittals rarely. The bail bonds of the acquitted accused stand discharged.