In Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani v. State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 11526 of 2026, 2026 INSC 987, decided on 7 September 2026 by a Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, the Supreme Court quashed an FIR under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The parties had met through a digital platform and been in a consensual relationship; the accused ultimately declined to marry, citing his mother's opposition. The Court held that Section 69 requires deception operating from the inception of the promise — a promise made in good faith and later broken for a genuine supervening reason does not attract the offence. It is one of the Supreme Court's early authoritative readings of this new provision.
A new provision, an old problem
Before 1 July 2024, prosecutions arising from intercourse on a promise of marriage travelled under Section 375 IPC read with the misconception-of-fact doctrine in Section 90: consent given under a misconception induced by a false promise was treated as no consent, making out rape. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita took a different structural choice. Section 69 BNS creates a distinct, lesser offence — sexual intercourse by deceitful means or on a promise to marry made without intention of fulfilment, where the act does not amount to rape — punishable with imprisonment up to ten years. The doctrinal question the courts had wrestled with for two decades under the IPC did not disappear; it migrated into the new provision. When is a promise "false"?
The facts before the Court
The complainant and the accused met through a digital platform in 2024 and developed a relationship that became physical. When the question of marriage came to a head, the accused declined, telling the complainant that his mother was opposed to the match. An FIR under Section 69 BNS followed at Vadodara. The High Court declined to quash it, and the matter reached the Supreme Court by special leave.
The Court's reasoning
The judgment carries forward, into the BNS era, the settled distinction between a false promise and a breach of promise. What is new and valuable is its application to Section 69's text: the phrase "without any intention of fulfilling it" statutorily anchors the inception test, so the prosecution must point to material contemporaneous with the promise — not merely to the fact that marriage did not happen.
Where the line falls
| Situation | Section 69 BNS attracted? |
|---|---|
| Accused concealed an existing marriage while promising to marry the complainant | Yes — deception from inception is evident. |
| Promise made sincerely; family opposition later prevents the marriage | No — a broken promise for a genuine supervening reason is not deceit. |
| Consent obtained by suppressing identity (religion, employment, marital status) as defined | Yes — "deceitful means" expressly covers such inducements. |
| Long consensual relationship between adults that simply ends | No — the criminal law does not police failed relationships. |
For the accused, the procedural takeaway is that quashing under Section 528 BNSS (corresponding to Section 482 CrPC) remains a real remedy where the FIR, taken at its highest, discloses only a broken promise. For complainants, the lesson is evidentiary: a Section 69 case stands or falls on material showing the promise was hollow when made — messages, conduct and circumstances at the time consent was obtained.
Significance
Early interpretation of the Sanhitas will shape charging practice for years. This decision signals that Section 69 BNS is not a strict-liability net over unsuccessful relationships; it is a targeted offence against sexual exploitation through deception. District courts and investigating officers can be expected to test FIRs against the inception standard the Supreme Court has now articulated, and bail and quashing practice in such cases will organise itself around that touchstone.
This article is for general information only and is not legal advice or a solicitation.
Frequently Asked Questions
What does Section 69 BNS punish?
Sexual intercourse obtained by deceitful means or by making a promise to marry without any intention of fulfilling it, where the act does not amount to rape. The punishment extends to ten years' imprisonment with fine. "Deceitful means" is defined inclusively to cover inducements such as false promises of employment or promotion, or marrying after suppressing identity.
How is a false promise distinguished from a broken promise?
The dividing line is intention at the time the promise was made. A promise that the maker never intended to keep, used to obtain consent, is a false promise. A promise made sincerely, which the maker later cannot or does not keep because of changed circumstances — family opposition, for instance — is a breach, and breach alone is not an offence.
Why did the Supreme Court quash this FIR?
The record showed a consensual relationship between adults who met online, and the accused's stated reason for not marrying was his mother's objection. The Court found nothing indicating that the promise was deceitful from inception, and continuing the prosecution on such material would be an abuse of process.
Does this dilute protection against genuine deception?
No. Where material shows the accused never intended marriage — concealment of an existing marriage, simultaneous engagements, or admissions to that effect — Section 69 squarely applies. The judgment polices the boundary so that failed relationships are not converted into criminal cases.