In Santosh Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1303-1305 of 2022 with Criminal Appeal No. 1306 of 2022, 2026 INSC 972, decided on 8 September 2026 by a Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, the Supreme Court partly allowed appeals by an injured eyewitness against a High Court judgment that had acquitted several accused in a murder case. Restoring the convictions of two of them while sustaining the acquittal of a third, the Court applied two workhorse doctrines of criminal appellate practice: the scope of interference with acquittals, and the reach of Section 34 IPC — under which participation in furtherance of a shared design, not personal infliction of the fatal blow, is what convicts.
An ambush, an injured witness, and a divided appellate record
The prosecution case arose from an ambush in which a group of armed men waylaid the deceased, who was shot dead; his brother, injured in the same incident, survived to testify. The trial court convicted four accused. The High Court, in appeal, sustained only one conviction and acquitted three others. The injured brother — a victim within the meaning of the criminal procedure code — carried the matter to the Supreme Court, challenging the acquittals; the medical evidence, including the recovery of dozens of pellets from the body, left no doubt about the manner of death. The questions were who participated, and in what legal character.
The appellate standard for reversing acquittals
An acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence, and appellate courts do not disturb it merely because another view is possible. But the deference has limits. Where the acquitting judgment overlooks the consistent testimony of an injured eyewitness — a witness whose presence at the scene is guaranteed by his own wounds — or reasons in a manner the record cannot support, the appellate court must correct it. That is what the Supreme Court did here: it re-examined the roles attributed to each acquitted accused and asked, for each, whether the High Court's doubt was a reasonable one or a misreading.
Injured eyewitnesses occupy a special evidentiary position. Their presence is stamped on their bodies, so their testimony is discarded only for compelling reasons. A High Court that acquits in the teeth of such testimony must explain precisely why it is unworthy of credit.
Section 34: participation, not marksmanship
The restored convictions turned on Section 34 IPC. The Court reiterated that where a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of a common intention, each is liable as if he had done the act himself. Two consequences follow. First, the prosecution need not prove which participant caused the fatal injury; the act of one is the act of all. Second, participation takes many forms — restraining the victim so the shot can be fired, exhorting a co-accused to fire, standing armed to prevent rescue. Each of these furthers the shared design. The accused whose convictions were restored had, on the evidence, played exactly such roles. The third accused, by contrast, could not be placed in a participatory role on substantive evidence, and his acquittal stood.
What practitioners should take from the decision
| For the defence | For the victim or prosecution |
|---|---|
| Attack the participation evidence accused by accused; Section 34 liability is individual in its foundation even though joint in its consequence. A successful severance of one accused's role, as with the third accused here, survives even Supreme Court scrutiny. | An appeal against acquittal is far from futile where an injured eyewitness's account has been discounted without adequate reasons. Frame the challenge around the specific roles the evidence assigns to each accused. |
| Do not concede the common-intention inference from mere presence; the law still distinguishes bystanders from participants. | Plead the exhortation and restraint evidence with precision — those acts, not the identity of the shooter, carry the Section 34 case. |
The judgment also underlines the practical force of victims' appellate rights: it was the injured survivor, not the State alone, who pursued the acquittals to the Supreme Court and secured their partial reversal. Convicted persons were granted time to surrender, and the sentences imposed by the trial court revived with the convictions.
This article is for general information only and is not legal advice or a solicitation.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can the Supreme Court reverse a High Court acquittal?
Yes, though it does so cautiously. Under Article 136, the Court interferes with acquittals where the High Court's view is perverse, ignores credible evidence, or rests on manifestly erroneous reasoning. Where the trial court's conviction was well-founded and the acquittal reflects a misreading of the record, restoration of the conviction is the established course.
What is common intention under Section 34 IPC?
A criminal act done by several persons in furtherance of a common intention makes each liable as if he did it alone. It requires a pre-arranged plan or a meeting of minds, which can form even moments before the act, and participation in some form. Holding down the victim or exhorting the shooter is participation; presence as a mere bystander is not.
Why was one acquittal sustained while two were reversed?
Because Section 34 analysis is accused-specific. For two accused, the injured eyewitness's account of their roles — restraint and exhortation — was consistent and corroborated. For the third, the substantive evidence of participation fell short, and the benefit of doubt given by the High Court was left undisturbed.
What is the BNS equivalent of Section 34 IPC?
Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the common-intention principle forward in materially the same terms for offences committed on or after 1 July 2024. The case law under Section 34 IPC continues to guide its application.