First information reports are frequently lodged by persons other than those actually injured by the alleged offence — a relative, a neighbour, a business associate, sometimes a stranger. When the accused and the person genuinely wronged later make peace, can the informant's opposition keep the prosecution alive? A Bench of Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Justice Arun Palli has now answered that question with clarity: it is the victim who authorises a settlement for the purpose of quashing, and the informant's consent is not a legal requirement.
The dispute
The prosecution arose out of a land transaction in Madhya Pradesh concerning about 54 acres, alleged to have been usurped through a forged power of attorney and consequent mutation entries. The FIR invoked the classic forgery-and-cheating cluster — Sections 420, 406, 466, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The complaint, however, had not been lodged by the recorded owner of the land. It was lodged by a third party who claimed an interest of his own but, as earlier proceedings had already noted, produced no documentary evidence of it.
During the pendency of proceedings, the recorded owner — the person actually affected by the impugned power of attorney and mutations — entered into a settlement with the accused and filed an affidavit stating that he had no grievance and did not oppose quashing. The informant objected. The High Court declined relief, and the matter reached the Supreme Court by special leave.
What the Court held
The Bench allowed the appeal and quashed the proceedings. Three strands of reasoning stand out.
Victim authorises settlement
What the law contemplates is that the real victim be party to the settlement on the basis of which quashing is sought. "It will only be the victim who can authorize a settlement."
Informant is not a gatekeeper
Anyone may set the criminal law in motion; that does not make every informant a victim. Allowing a non-victim informant to block a genuine settlement would hand the prosecution to a person who suffered no legal injury.
Civil flavour matters
The allegations overwhelmingly bore a civil, commercial character. With the victim's contrary affidavit on record, the chance of conviction was remote and continuation would be an abuse of process.
The Court applied the framework of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012), the Constitution-Bench-endorsed line under which the High Court's inherent power may be used to quash non-compoundable offences of a predominantly private character upon settlement, while offences of a heinous or public nature remain outside that dispensation. The addition this judgment makes is to identify whose settlement counts: the statutory victim — the person who has suffered loss or injury by reason of the act complained of — and not whoever happened to sign the first information.
Why the distinction matters
The judgment addresses a recurring tactical pattern in property and commercial prosecutions. An FIR is lodged by a person adjacent to the dispute — a co-claimant, a rival transferee, an estranged family member — and even after the person truly aggrieved makes peace, the informant continues the criminal case as leverage in a parallel civil battle. By locating the power to settle in the victim, the Court removes that leverage. Equally, the Court's caution cuts the other way: where an informant can demonstrate real loss or injury, he is himself a victim and his position cannot be brushed aside.
Practice note: In quashing petitions before the High Court of Delhi under Section 528 of the BNSS (the successor to Section 482 CrPC), the settlement should be evidenced by the victim's own affidavit, the victim's identity as the person legally injured should be squarely pleaded, and any objector's locus should be tested against the statutory definition of "victim" rather than assumed from the FIR's cause title.
The framework at a glance
| Question | Position after this judgment |
|---|---|
| Whose consent is needed for settlement-based quashing? | The real victim's — the person who suffered loss or injury from the offence. |
| Can a non-victim informant block quashing? | No. The informant is heard, but consent is not a legal requirement. |
| Which offences remain outside settlement-based quashing? | Heinous and serious offences and those with a dominant public dimension, per the Gian Singh line. |
| What else weighs with the court? | Predominantly civil flavour of the dispute, remoteness of conviction, and abuse of process if the trial continues. |
The decision was rendered on 31 August 2026 by a Bench of Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Justice Arun Palli in appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 19051 of 2025, and is reported as 2026 INSC 928.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does this mean any FIR can be quashed once the victim settles?
No. The settled framework recognised in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, which the judgment applies, continues to govern: offences that are predominantly private or civil in flavour may be quashed on settlement, while heinous offences such as murder, rape or dacoity, and crimes with a serious public dimension, ordinarily cannot be, whatever the parties agree.
Who counts as the "victim" for this purpose?
The person who has suffered loss or injury by reason of the act or omission of the accused — the statutory definition carried in the procedure code. In this case the Court identified the owner of the land affected by the allegedly forged power of attorney as the victim, and found that the informant had no demonstrated proprietary interest of his own.
What if the informant claims to be a victim too?
The question is one of substance, not labels. The Court examined the record and found no documentary basis for the informant's claim to a share in the land. A person who can show real loss or injury from the offence stands on a different footing and would have to be heard; a bare claim does not confer a veto.
How is this applied in Delhi?
Petitions are filed before the High Court of Delhi under Section 528 BNSS (old Section 482 CrPC) with the settlement placed on record, usually supported by the victim's affidavit. The victim's genuine, voluntary participation is central; the State and the informant are heard, but opposition from a non-victim informant is not, by itself, a bar.