Bail jurisprudence under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 turns on role attribution more than on the length of custody or the fate of co-accused. In Sharjeel Imam v. State of NCT of Delhi (CRL.A. 647/2026) and the connected appeal of Umar Khalid (CRL.A. 720/2026), decided on 30 September 2026, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court — Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Dinesh Bhatt — dismissed bail appeals filed under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 in the case arising from FIR No. 59/2020 concerning the alleged larger conspiracy behind the 2020 Delhi riots.
The case and the charge-structure
FIR No. 59/2020, registered with the Crime Branch, Delhi, alleges a larger conspiracy behind the riots of February 2020. The chargesheet invokes Sections 13, 16, 17 and 18 of the UAPA alongside conspiracy and rioting provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and offences under the Arms Act and the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act. Because the UAPA offences are scheduled offences, bail is governed by the rigours of Section 43D(5), and appellate challenges travel under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act to a Division Bench.
The trial court had declined bail; the appeals brought that refusal before the High Court. Arguments on charge in the main case concluded in July 2026, and a set of protected witnesses remains to be examined.
What the Division Bench held
The Bench treated the appellants as occupying a distinct position in the alleged conspiracy — described in the proceedings as core conspirators and ideological drivers — and on that basis declined to extend the benefit co-accused had received.
Earlier bail orders in favour of co-accused such as Tasleem Ahmed and Abdul Khalid Saifi did not assist, because the Court found their alleged roles to be those of local-level facilitators, not architects of the conspiracy.
The Supreme Court’s order in the co-accused Gulfisha Fatima’s case had structured the timetable for renewed bail attempts — after the protected witnesses are examined or after one year from 5 January 2026, whichever is earlier. The High Court considered itself bound by that framework.
The Section 43D(5) threshold, briefly
For scheduled offences, the UAPA inverts the familiar bail presumption. The court must refuse bail where, on a perusal of the final report, there are reasonable grounds to believe the accusation is prima facie true. The settled approach requires the court to take the prosecution material at face value at this stage, without the mini-trial that ordinary bail hearings sometimes become. The battlegrounds are therefore narrow: whether the material, even accepted as it stands, connects the particular accused to the alleged offence, and whether the role attributed is of a kind the statute targets.
Long incarceration as a trial proceeds can itself become a constitutional ground for bail under Article 21, and the Supreme Court has granted bail on delay in several UAPA matters. But that argument, too, is weighed against the stage of trial and the roles alleged — and in this case the Division Bench found the balance against the appellants, with the Supreme Court’s renewal conditions marking the path ahead.
What practitioners can take from the ruling
The judgment does not decide guilt or innocence; charges themselves are yet to be framed, and the trial will test the prosecution’s material. What it settles, for now, is the bail position of the two appellants and the disciplined sequence in which any renewed attempt must come.
Frequently Asked Questions
What makes bail under the UAPA harder than ordinary bail?
Section 43D(5) of the UAPA bars bail for scheduled offences if the court, on a perusal of the case diary or chargesheet, finds reasonable grounds for believing the accusation is prima facie true. At that threshold stage the court does not weigh evidence as at trial; it examines whether the material, taken as it stands, connects the accused to the alleged offence.
How are UAPA bail orders challenged?
Where the case is tried by a Special Court, bail grants and refusals are challenged by appeal under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, which lies to a Division Bench of the High Court — not by the ordinary bail route under Section 483 BNSS (Section 439 CrPC).
Why did parity with co-accused who got bail fail here?
The Court held that the appellants' alleged roles as core conspirators and ideological drivers of the conspiracy were materially different from co-accused characterised as local-level facilitators. Parity in bail operates only between accused whose roles are genuinely comparable.
Can the appellants apply for bail again?
The judgment notes the conditions set by the Supreme Court in the co-accused Gulfisha Fatima's case: a renewed application can follow completion of the examination of the protected witnesses or the expiry of one year from 5 January 2026, whichever is earlier. Any fresh application would be tested on the circumstances then existing.