Arbitrations are built around people, and people fail: health intervenes, ineligibility surfaces, diaries choke, arbitrators resign, and occasionally a tribunal simply stops moving. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 addresses these ruptures in two provisions that receive far less attention than the challenge machinery of Sections 12 and 13 but do at least as much work. Section 14 terminates an arbitrator's mandate where he becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his functions or fails to act without undue delay, and channels live controversies about such termination to the court. Section 15 sweeps in the remaining terminations — withdrawal and party agreement — and supplies the substitution rules that keep the reference alive. This explainer covers both, with the practice points that matter in Delhi.
The four exits from a mandate
Read together, Sections 14 and 15 recognise four ways an arbitrator's mandate ends short of the award. Inability: de jure or de facto incapacity to perform the functions of the office. Delay: failure to act without undue delay — the statute's answer to the dormant tribunal. Withdrawal: the arbitrator resigns from office, for any reason. Agreement: the parties jointly terminate the mandate. The first two operate by force of Section 14(1)(a); the second two are gathered by Section 15(1). A fifth, related exit — successful challenge under Sections 12 and 13 — has its own procedure and its own article on this site; and the Section 29A time-limit machinery adds a sixth dynamic in domestic awards, where court-ordered extension can come with substitution.
| Route | Provision | Forum |
|---|---|---|
| De jure / de facto inability; undue delay | Section 14(1)(a) | Court application under Section 14(2) where controversy remains |
| Withdrawal by the arbitrator | Sections 14(1)(b), 15(1)(a) | No adjudication needed; substitution follows |
| Agreement of the parties | Sections 14(1)(b), 15(1)(b) | Consensual; substitution follows |
| Ineligibility under Section 12(5) | Seventh Schedule read with Section 14 | Mandate void at the root; court declaration available |
Section 14 applications in practice
The Section 14(2) application is the litigant's remedy when a tribunal has failed in fact but not in form. Two scenarios dominate. The first is ineligibility: an arbitrator whose appointment offends Section 12(5) — an employee, consultant or other Seventh Schedule relation of a party, appointed without the post-dispute express written waiver the proviso requires — suffers de jure inability, and a party may seek a declaration that the mandate stands terminated, with a fresh appointment to follow. The second is stagnation: references where months pass without hearings, orders or any sign of progress. Here the statute's phrase — "fails to act without undue delay" — calls for a documented record: requests for dates, unanswered communications, a chronology of inactivity. Courts approach removal for delay with restraint, preferring to prod tribunals before replacing them, so the application should present delay that is substantial, unexplained and prejudicial. Throughout, the underlying reference need not halt; the pendency of a mandate controversy does not by itself stay the arbitration.
Substitution and continuity
Section 15(2) makes substitution mimetic: the substitute is appointed according to the rules that governed the outgoing arbitrator's appointment. A party-appointed arbitrator is replaced by that party's fresh nomination; a presiding arbitrator chosen by co-arbitrators is replaced the same way; an institutional appointment returns to the institution; and where the mechanism breaks down, Section 11 supplies the court or its designate. The continuity rules then protect the investment already made. Orders and rulings survive under Section 15(4). Hearings stand where the parties so agree; otherwise the reconstituted tribunal decides what to repeat under Section 15(3) — in practice, a fresh arbitrator re-hears oral evidence where credibility matters, and adopts the documentary record. Parties negotiating at the moment of substitution should record their agreement on exactly these points, because a paragraph of consensus at reconstitution saves weeks of argument later.
When a tribunal stalls or an eligibility doubt surfaces: assemble the chronology and correspondence; raise the issue squarely with the tribunal first; consider whether the ground is Seventh Schedule ineligibility (Section 14 declaration), challengeable partiality (Sections 12–13), or delay; verify the Section 2(1)(e) court for any application; and prepare the substitution mechanics in advance so the reference restarts within days, not months, of a termination.
The design principle
Sections 14 and 15 embody the 1996 Act's quiet promise: the arbitration is bigger than the arbitrator. Mandates end — by law, fact, choice or consent — but the reference persists, the record survives, and the parties' bargain for private adjudication is preserved through substitution rather than surrendered to the courts. Used with the documentation and restraint the courts expect, they are the machinery that keeps a wounded arbitration alive.
The chamber of Advocate Manish Jha advises and appears in arbitration proceedings and related court applications before the District Courts of Delhi, the High Court of Delhi and the Supreme Court of India. This article is for general information; it is not legal advice and does not create an advocate-client relationship.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the difference between de jure and de facto inability?
De jure inability is legal: the arbitrator has become disqualified in law from acting — the paradigm being ineligibility under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule, which strikes at the root of the mandate. De facto inability is factual: illness, incapacity or circumstances that in fact prevent performance. Either terminates the mandate under Section 14(1)(a), as does failure to act without undue delay.
Which court decides a Section 14 controversy?
If a controversy remains concerning any ground in Section 14(1)(a), a party may apply to "the Court" — as defined in Section 2(1)(e) — to decide on the termination of the mandate. For domestic arbitrations this means the principal civil court of the district or, where the High Court exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction, that High Court; in Delhi, subject to pecuniary jurisdiction, applications concerning commercial arbitrations of the requisite value come before the High Court of Delhi.
How is a substitute arbitrator appointed?
Under Section 15(2), according to the rules that were applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced — the original contractual mechanism, institutional rules, or the Section 11 route where the mechanism fails. The reference then continues: previously held hearings may be repeated at the tribunal's discretion unless the parties agree otherwise, and prior orders and rulings do not become invalid merely because the tribunal's composition changed.
Does replacing an arbitrator restart the arbitration?
No. Section 15(4) preserves orders and rulings made before the replacement, and Section 15(3) leaves the question of repeating earlier hearings to the parties' agreement or the substitute tribunal's discretion. In practice, documents-stage work survives intact, and tribunals repeat only what fairness requires — most commonly witness evidence the new arbitrator did not hear.