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Home › Section 9: After the Award
Delhi High Court · 28 October 2026

Losing the Award, Keeping the Property: Interim Protection Under Section 9 for an Unsuccessful Claimant

In Thor Ventures (OPC) Pvt. Ltd. v. Nyeq Technologies Pvt. Ltd., O.M.P.(I)(COMM.) 461–462/2026, decided on 28 October 2026, Justice Tushar Rao Gedela restrained the respondent from alienating two DLF Gurugram properties pending a Section 34 challenge, holding that the tribunal's sham-document finding was prima facie based on no evidence and that rare and compelling circumstances justified protecting an unsuccessful claimant.

Interim relief after an arbitral award usually belongs to the winner. In Thor Ventures (OPC) Pvt. Ltd. v. Nyeq Technologies Pvt. Ltd., O.M.P.(I)(COMM.) 461/2026 and 462/2026, decided on 28 October 2026, the Delhi High Court granted it to the loser: a claimant whose prayer for specific performance of two agreements to sell was rejected by the arbitrator obtained a restraint on the sale of the very properties, pending its challenge under Section 34. The judgment shows what the "rare and compelling circumstances" threshold for an unsuccessful party actually looks like in operation.

The transaction and the award

In May 2019 the parties executed two agreements to sell for properties in DLF City Phase-I, Gurugram, each for Rs 5.62 crore, with Rs 5 lakh paid toward each. The buyer\'s ability to pay the balance rested on a loan sanction letter from an RBI-registered NBFC. The deal collapsed; the seller refunded the advance in February 2021 and the buyer invoked arbitration the same day, obtaining a stay from the arbitrator within days. Five years on, the award of 26 September 2026 produced a split result: the agreements were held valid, but the tribunal found the loan sanction letter to be a sham, held the buyer had not demonstrated readiness and willingness, refused specific performance and the injunction, and imposed costs of Rs 15 lakh. The buyer filed Section 9 petitions seeking to preserve the properties while it challenges the award under Section 34.

The threshold for an unsuccessful party

Section 9 permits interim measures after the award and before enforcement, but the position of a party that has already lost is structurally different: the award stands in its way. Relying on the Supreme Court\'s ruling in Home Care Retail Marts v. Haresh N. Sanghavi (2026 INSC 415), Justice Tushar Rao Gedela proceeded on the footing that an unsuccessful claimant must show rare and compelling circumstances before a court will freeze the subject matter pending the Section 34 challenge. The judgment then found them.

A finding on no evidence. The tribunal\'s conclusion that the loan sanction letter was a sham was prima facie unsupported: the document\'s authenticity was neither questioned nor discredited, and no challenge to its genuineness was ever put to the buyer\'s witness in cross-examination.
A judgment-proof respondent. The seller appeared to have no assets other than the two properties — so a successful Section 34 outcome followed by fresh proceedings could prove worthless if the properties were sold meanwhile.
A remedy money cannot replace. After the 2018 amendment to the Specific Relief Act, the grant of specific performance is a mandate, not a discretion; damages are no longer the default substitute for conveyance of specific immovable property.

The balance the Court struck

The operative order restrains the respondent from selling, alienating or creating third-party rights in the two properties until the next date, with a reply in three weeks, rejoinder in two, and listing on 2 December 2026. The Court reasoned that without protection, the efficacy of the Section 34 challenge would be rendered nugatory — the classic justification for preserving the res. It also distinguished precedent pressed by the seller on the ground that, unlike the litigant there, this buyer had asserted and evidenced its financial capacity to pay the price.

The decision pairs instructively with the same week\'s Division Bench ruling in Flowmore v. Skipper: in both, the lever was a core arbitral finding that prima facie rested on no evidence. The lesson for arbitrations is procedural — a document the opposing side never confronts in cross-examination is very hard to call a sham in the award; and the lesson for post-award strategy is that such a defect, spotted early, can found not only the Section 34 challenge but interim protection that keeps the dispute worth winning.

For transaction and dispute counsel

Buyers under agreements to sell should treat this judgment as the current Delhi template for post-award preservation: plead the respondent\'s asset position specifically, establish financial readiness on the record, and move under Section 9 immediately upon an adverse award rather than waiting for the Section 34 hearing. Sellers and award-holders, conversely, should expect that an application to vacate or resist such protection will turn on evidence of other assets and on defending the tribunal\'s findings as evidence-based — and should remember that an interim restraint is not a reversal: the award, including its costs component, remains alive until the Section 34 court rules.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can a party that lost the arbitration seek interim protection under Section 9?

Yes, but on a higher threshold. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Home Care Retail Marts v. Haresh N. Sanghavi (2026 INSC 415), a court may protect the subject matter at the instance of an unsuccessful party pending its Section 34 challenge only in rare and compelling circumstances — the award carries a presumption of validity that ordinary prima facie arguments do not displace.

What were the rare and compelling circumstances here?

Three combined: the tribunal's central finding — that the buyer's loan sanction letter was a sham — appeared prima facie to rest on no evidence, the document never having been challenged in cross-examination; the seller appeared to have no assets other than the two properties; and after the 2018 amendment to the Specific Relief Act, specific performance is a mandate rather than a discretion, so money could not compensate the buyer if the properties were sold meanwhile.

What relief was granted?

The respondent was restrained from selling, alienating or creating third-party rights in the two DLF City, Gurugram properties until the next hearing, with pleadings directed and the matter listed on 2 December 2026 alongside the connected petitions. The protection preserves the subject matter so that the Section 34 challenge is not rendered academic.

Does this mean the award is likely to be set aside?

Not necessarily. Section 9 findings are prima facie and provisional. The Court's observation that no question challenging the loan sanction letter's genuineness was ever put to the witness is significant for the Section 34 court, but the challenge will be decided on its own standards, including the limited grounds for interfering with arbitral findings of fact.

Note: This article is general information about the law and is not legal advice. It does not create an advocate-client relationship. The position stated is as at 30 October 2026 and may have changed since. Readers should verify any provision or decision referred to against the official text and seek advice on their own circumstances.