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Delhi High Court · 9 September 2026

When the Conviction Falls, the Deposit Goes Back: Delhi High Court on Section 148(3) NI Act

The 20% appellate deposit in a cheque bounce case is security, not a windfall — acquittal triggers a mandatory repayment obligation on the complainant.

In Arun Malhotra v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr., CRL.M.C. 9373/2023 (decided 9 September 2026), the Delhi High Court dismissed a complainant's challenge to a trial court order directing him to refund ₹5,44,000 — the 20% deposit an accused had made under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 while appealing his cheque bounce conviction. The appellate court having ultimately acquitted the accused, the High Court held that Section 148(3) casts a mandatory obligation on the complainant to repay the amount released to him, reinforced in this case by the complainant's own undertaking, and that it made no difference which court issued the refund direction.

The life cycle of the deposit

The complainant prosecuted two persons under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for dishonoured cheques. The trial court convicted them and imposed a fine of ₹27,20,000. The accused appealed, and as a condition attached to the appellate process, deposited 20% — ₹5,44,000 — under Section 148. The money was released to the complainant. The appellate court then heard the appeal and acquitted both accused. The trial court, acting on the acquittal, directed the complainant to refund the deposit. Rather than repay, the complainant petitioned the High Court, contending among other things that the trial court could not direct the refund.

The statutory command

The High Court's answer proceeded directly from the text. Section 148(3) provides that where the appellant is acquitted, the court shall direct the complainant to repay to the appellant the amount so released, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India. The single judge treated the language as creating a mandatory obligation that arises upon acquittal itself. The complainant's undertaking before the appellate court — a routine feature when Section 148 amounts are released — reinforced the duty. Which particular court formalised the direction was immaterial; the obligation flows from the statute, not from the forum.

Conviction — trial court sentences under Section 138 and awards fine or compensation.
Appeal with deposit — appellate court directs a minimum 20% deposit under Section 148(1); the amount may be released to the complainant against an undertaking.
Acquittal — Section 148(3) obliges the complainant to repay the released amount with interest, on the court's direction.

What the decision settles for Delhi practice

First, complainants who receive Section 148 money should treat it as provisional. The release is an interim protection tied to the conviction's survival; spending it as if the litigation were over invites a repayment order with interest, and resistance can add costs. Prudent complainants keep the amount identifiable until the appeal concludes.

Second, acquitted accused have a straightforward path to recovery. The demand should be made before the court seized of the matter, invoking Section 148(3) and any undertaking recorded at the time of release. This judgment forecloses technical objections about which court — trial or appellate — should pass the consequential direction.

Third, the decision preserves the balance the 2018 amendments struck. The deposit regime removed the incentive to file dilatory appeals; the mandatory refund removes the mirror-image risk that an ultimately innocent drawer permanently loses a fifth of the award simply because the appellate process took years.

The refund obligation concerns the statutory deposit alone. It does not adjudicate the underlying commercial dispute: a complainant with a genuine debt claim may still pursue civil remedies within limitation, and an acquittal on the criminal standard does not automatically defeat a civil recovery action.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the Section 148 deposit in cheque bounce appeals?

When a person convicted under Section 138 of the NI Act appeals, the appellate court may direct a deposit of a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court. The provision, inserted in 2018, was designed to prevent appeals from becoming a device to stall payment.

What happens to that deposit if the appeal succeeds?

Section 148(3) provides that where the appellant is acquitted, the court shall direct the complainant to repay the amount released to the appellant, with interest as specified. This decision confirms the obligation is mandatory, not discretionary.

Can the complainant resist refund because a different court ordered it?

No. The Delhi High Court held that the identity of the court issuing the refund direction does not dilute the statutory duty. Once acquittal occurs, repayment follows — particularly where the complainant undertook before the appellate court to return the money.

Does an acquittal in the criminal case end the complainant's civil remedies?

Not necessarily. A civil or commercial suit for recovery of the underlying debt, if within limitation, stands on its own footing. The refund concerns only the statutory deposit made as a condition of the criminal appeal.

Note: This article is general information about the law and is not legal advice. It does not create an advocate-client relationship. The position stated is as at 13 September 2026 and may have changed since. Readers should verify any provision or decision referred to against the official text and seek advice on their own circumstances.