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Home › Seat v. Venue
Delhi High Court · 3 August 2026

Seat or Venue? An Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause Decides a Section 9 Petition

A judgment of 3 August 2026 shows how a conflict between an arbitration clause naming Delhi and an exclusive jurisdiction clause naming Jaipur is resolved — and why the petition failed.

Commercial agreements frequently contain two clauses drafted at different moments and never read together: an arbitration clause naming one city, and a jurisdiction clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of another. Which court then hears an application for interim measures? In Valency Agro Private Limited v. Star Agri Warehousing and Collateral Management Limited, O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 302/2026, decided on 3 August 2026, the Delhi High Court dismissed a Section 9 petition for want of territorial jurisdiction, holding that the exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of Jaipur showed that Delhi was intended only as the physical venue of the arbitration, not its juridical seat.

The dispute

The petitioner, a trader in agricultural commodities, sought urgent interim measures under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, including the appointment of a receiver to secure access to a substantial quantity of paddy — about 696 metric tonnes — lying in a warehouse managed by the respondent. The parties' relationship was governed by a Warehouse Management Agreement dated 20 February 2024.

The agreement contained the two provisions that decided the case. Clause 9 provided that arbitration proceedings "shall be held in Delhi". Clause 11 conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the competent courts at Jaipur. The respondent objected at the threshold: if Jaipur courts had exclusive jurisdiction, the Delhi High Court could not entertain the petition at all.

The legal framework

Justice Om Prakash Shukla approached the question through the settled distinction between the seat and the venue of an arbitration. Once a seat is determined, the designation operates like an exclusive jurisdiction clause: only the courts of the seat may exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration, including under Section 9. The judgment drew on the Supreme Court's decisions in BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234, and Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Micromax Informatics FZE, 2024 INSC 850, the latter for the proposition that the seat is to be identified by reading the agreement holistically rather than by fastening on a single clause.

Step one

Identify the place named in the arbitration clause. A designated place is ordinarily the seat, carrying with it the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts of that place.

Step two

Search the agreement for significant contrary indicia — provisions inconsistent with that place being the juridical seat, such as a clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of a different place.

Step three

Where contrary indicia exist, the named place is reduced to a venue, and supervisory jurisdiction follows the seat indicated by the agreement read as a whole.

The holding

Applying that framework, the Court held that the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Jaipur courts by Clause 11 was a strong contrary indication that Delhi was intended only as the physical location of hearings. Reading the two clauses together, the juridical seat was not Delhi, and the supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration — including the power to grant interim measures under Section 9 — belonged to the courts at Jaipur. The petition was accordingly dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction, with liberty to the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum.

The dismissal was on jurisdiction alone. The Court did not examine whether the petitioner was otherwise entitled to a receiver or to protection of the stored commodity; those questions were left for the competent court. For a party seeking urgent interim relief, a threshold dismissal of this kind is costly precisely because the merits are never reached.

Drafting lessons

Disputes of this kind are almost always the product of drafting rather than of law. Three lessons emerge.

Say "seat", not merely "held in"

An arbitration clause that states the seat of arbitration in terms — and, if hearings may occur elsewhere, distinguishes the venue — removes the ambiguity on which this litigation turned.

Align the jurisdiction clause

The exclusive jurisdiction clause should name the courts of the same place as the seat. Where the two point in different directions, one of them will be read down, and a party cannot be certain in advance which.

Check before filing

Before instituting a Section 9 petition, the agreement must be read as a whole. Filing in the wrong court forfeits time, and urgent relief delayed can be relief denied in commercial reality.

The wider picture

The judgment applies, rather than extends, the seat-centric approach the Supreme Court has developed: the seat, once identified, centralises supervisory jurisdiction; and identification of the seat is an exercise in construing the whole agreement. What the decision usefully illustrates for commercial parties in Delhi is the practical operation of that doctrine at the interim-measures stage, where speed matters most. A warehouse full of perishable commodity waits for no court, and the time spent litigating where to litigate is time the subject matter of the dispute may not have.

Parties negotiating warehousing, supply and collateral management agreements — a common feature of agri-commodity finance — should treat the arbitration and jurisdiction clauses as a single scheme to be drafted together. Where an agreement already contains the mismatch, the safer course is to assess the seat question candidly before any application is made, and to file where the agreement, read as a whole, points.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the difference between the seat and the venue of an arbitration?

The seat is the juridical home of the arbitration: the courts of the seat exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings, including applications for interim measures and challenges to the award. The venue is merely the place where hearings are physically held. The two often coincide, but where they diverge it is the seat that determines which court has jurisdiction.

Does naming a city in the arbitration clause make it the seat?

Usually, the designation of a place of arbitration is treated as the seat unless there is a significant contrary indication elsewhere in the agreement. An exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the courts of a different city can be exactly such a contrary indication, reducing the named place to a mere venue.

What is a Section 9 petition?

Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 permits a party to seek interim measures of protection from a court before or during arbitral proceedings, or after the award but before enforcement — for example the appointment of a receiver, securing the subject matter of the dispute, or restraining disposal of assets. It must be filed in the court that has jurisdiction over the arbitration.

What happens if a petition is filed in the wrong court?

The court examines its territorial jurisdiction at the threshold, and if it finds it lacks jurisdiction the petition is dismissed or returned, ordinarily with liberty to approach the competent court. Time and any urgency in the interim relief sought are lost in the process, which is why the seat question deserves attention before filing rather than after.

Note: This article is general information about the law and is not legal advice. It does not create an advocate-client relationship. The position stated is as at 8 August 2026 and may have changed since. Readers should verify any provision or decision referred to against the official text and seek advice on their own circumstances.