When can a public servant insist that a prosecution cannot proceed without the government's prior sanction? The Jharkhand High Court's decision of 18 September 2026 in the money-laundering proceedings against the former Chief Minister of Jharkhand engages that question on classical terrain. The Court dismissed the challenge, holding that the allegations — concerning possession of tribal land and manipulation of revenue records — related to no function conferred on the office the petitioner held, and that the sanction question, if it arises at all, can be decided at trial on the evidence.
The proceedings
The Enforcement Directorate's case, registered as ECIR Case No. 6/2023, alleges illegal possession of 8.86 acres of tribal land and the creation of falsified revenue records through a syndicate involving government officials, with proceedings under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, in the backdrop of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act's protections for tribal land. Before the High Court in revision, the petitioner contended that the prosecution could not proceed without prior sanction under Section 197(1) CrPC — now Section 218 of the BNSS — given the office he held at the relevant time.
The Court's framework
Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad distilled the sanction protection into three ingredients: a public servant not removable from office save by or with the sanction of the government; an act connected with official duty; and a reasonable nexus between the act and that duty. The anchor of the analysis is functional, drawing on the settled line of authority — the order discusses the classical test from Matajog Dobey — that asks whether the act complained of was done in the course of, and in reasonable connection with, the performance of official functions. Blanket immunity for everything done while in office has never been the law.
Applying the test
No statutory function, no nexus
The Court found that no statute conferred on the office held by the petitioner any function respecting the making, correction or protection of entries in Register-II; those powers belonged to the Deputy Commissioner and revenue officers. Acts concerning those registers therefore could not, prima facie, be official acts of that office.
Misuse is not discharge
The allegations, taken at this stage, portrayed misuse of position — leveraging office to influence proceedings — rather than discharge of duty. The protection attaches to duty, not to power.
Timing of the question
The sanction issue need not be resolved before trial. It arises only upon a conclusion that the act was done in discharge of official duty — a determination that may emerge at any stage on the evidence.
Why the timing point matters
Sanction pleas are frequently deployed as threshold barriers, halting trials at the outset. The approach affirmed here — that the question can be deferred until the factual foundation exists to answer it — keeps the protection intact for genuine official acts while preventing its use as a universal pause button. The revision was accordingly dismissed and the trial proceedings will continue, with the sanction question expressly preserved for determination on the evidence, without prejudice to the ultimate adjudication.
Practical notes
For accused public servants: plead the specific statutory function said to cover the act, with chapter and verse — the nexus inquiry is functional, and generalities about holding office do not survive it.
For the prosecution: charge documents should identify whose statutory function the impugned acts actually were; that mapping did decisive work in this case.
Sanction under Section 218 BNSS and cognate protections (such as Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, where it applies) operate differently — identify which regime governs each count.
A deferred sanction question is not a lost one: build the trial record with the eventual sanction argument in mind.
The wider relevance
Prosecutions of serving and former public functionaries under the PMLA are now a standing feature of Indian criminal practice, and the sanction question recurs in nearly all of them. This judgment supplies a current, closely reasoned template: identify the office's statutory functions, test the nexus, and let the trial — not the threshold — resolve what the evidence alone can answer.
This article is for general information only and is not legal advice or a solicitation.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the sanction protection under Section 197 CrPC / Section 218 BNSS?
It bars courts from taking cognizance of offences alleged against certain public servants for acts done, or purporting to be done, in the discharge of official duty, unless the competent government sanctions the prosecution. Its object is to protect honest officers from vexatious prosecution for official acts — not to immunise every act of a person who happens to hold office.
What test did the High Court apply?
Three ingredients: the accused must be a public servant of the protected category; the act must be connected with official duty; and there must be a reasonable nexus between the act and the duty. Whether an act falls within official duty is substantially a question of fact, judged by whether the act can be said to have been done in the course of performing the office's functions.
Why was sanction held unnecessary here at this stage?
Because, prima facie, the allegations — illegal possession of 8.86 acres of land and orchestration of falsified entries in revenue registers — connected to no statutory function of the office held. The Court noted that no statute conferred on that office any function respecting the making, correction or protection of entries in Register-II; those powers vested in revenue officials. Misuse of position is not discharge of duty.
Is the sanction question closed for good?
No. The Court expressly kept it open: if at trial the evidence shows the acts were relatable to official duty, the sanction requirement can be examined then. The ruling only rejects the plea that sanction had to be decided before the trial could commence.