The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 created a little-used criminal remedy: Section 92 punishes, among other things, intentionally insulting or intimidating a person with disability with intent to humiliate. In Vikas Gupta v. Ranjana Agarwal (CRL.REV.P. 17/2026, decided on 13 October 2026), Justice Prateek Jalan of the Delhi High Court set aside a Special Court's threshold dismissal of such a complaint filed by a man with 86% locomotor disability against his former wife and her relatives, holding the dismissal order "perfunctory and unjustifiable" for ignoring the complaint's allegations of continuing conduct.
An unusual statute in a familiar setting
The backdrop is a matrimonial conflict of long standing: a 2012 marriage that lasted weeks, a divorce granted by a Family Court in 2020 with the appeal pending, and years of cross-litigation. What distinguishes the case is the statute invoked. Rather than the usual matrimonial provisions, the complainant — who has 86% permanent locomotor disability — filed a complaint under Section 92 of the RPwD Act, 2016, alleging insults and humiliation directed at his disability, from the period of the marriage through to incidents in 2025, including interference at his workplace.
The threshold error
The Special Court\'s dismissal proceeded on three grounds: vagueness, staleness and abuse of process. Each is a legitimate consideration — but only after the whole complaint is read. The High Court\'s criticism was precise: the order overlooked the alleged continuing conduct, most notably the incident of 5 July 2025, and judged the complaint as if it concerned 2012 alone. A complaint that alleges a course of conduct cannot be dismissed by testing only its earliest chapter.
Revision against dismissal of a complaint
A complainant whose complaint is dismissed at the threshold is not without remedy. The dismissal of a complaint is a final order for the complainant, and the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court or the High Court — under Sections 397/401 CrPC, now Sections 438/442 of the BNSS — permits examination of its legality and propriety. The standard is not whether the revisional court would have summoned the accused, but whether the Magistrate or Special Court applied the correct legal approach. Failing to read the complaint as a whole, ignoring material allegations, or dismissing without the brief reasoned application of mind the law requires are all recognised grounds of interference — and this judgment adds a clear illustration in the RPwD context.
Practice pointers on RPwD complaints
| Issue | Guidance from the judgment |
|---|---|
| Forum | Complaints under Section 92 go to the designated Special Court for RPwD Act offences in the district |
| Pleading | Set out specific incidents with dates; a course of conduct should be pleaded as such, linking older and recent events |
| Old allegations | Historical conduct alone invites a staleness objection; continuing or recent incidents must be clearly particularised |
| Vagueness objections | Can be met through further particulars and pre-summoning evidence rather than outright dismissal |
| Parallel matrimonial litigation | Does not by itself make a disability-rights complaint an abuse of process; the complaint must be tested on its own allegations |
The wider point
Disability-rights enforcement in India has largely run through the Commissioners and the writ jurisdiction; the criminal provisions of the RPwD Act remain sparsely litigated. This decision does not expand their substance, but it protects their procedural integrity: a Special Court must engage with what is actually alleged before closing the door. For respondents, equally, the judgment preserves every defence — vagueness, limitation, abuse of process — provided the court addresses them against the complaint as a whole, by a reasoned order.
The revision petition was disposed of with observations expressly confined to the legality of the dismissal order; nothing in the judgment, or in this note, bears on the truth of the allegations, which remain to be tested before the Special Court.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Section 92 of the RPwD Act?
It is the penal provision of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, covering specified offences against persons with disabilities — including intentional insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. Offences under the Act are tried by designated Special Courts, and Section 84 provides for their designation in each district.
Why did the Special Court dismiss the complaint?
It found the allegations vague, noted that most dated back to 2012, and characterised the complaint as an abuse of process — the complainant and respondent no. 1 have litigated against each other for years across multiple forums since their 2012 marriage and separation. The complaint was dismissed on 15 December 2025 without summoning the accused.
On what basis did the High Court interfere in revision?
Because the Special Court did not consider the complaint as a whole. The complaint alleged not only historical conduct from 2012 but also later incidents — including one of 5 July 2025 and alleged interference at the complainant's workplace. A court assessing a complaint at the threshold must read all of it; overlooking the recent allegations made the order unsustainable. The matter was remanded for fresh consideration, with the option of seeking further particulars through pre-summoning evidence.
Does the remand mean the accused will be summoned?
No. The High Court expressly confined its observations to the legality of the dismissal order and expressed no opinion on the merits. On remand the Special Court must apply its mind afresh — it may summon, seek pre-summoning evidence, or dismiss again by a reasoned order. The complainant was also left free to pursue remedies for incidents occurring after the complaint.