In Gopal Lodhi v. State of M.P. & Anr., Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7332 of 2026, decided on 26 October 2026 and reported as 2026 INSC 1164, the Supreme Court confronted a recurring fault line in criminal practice: the quashing of serious, non-compoundable offences on the basis of a private settlement. The Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran set aside the High Court’s quashing order, directed that the trial proceed, and — unusually in the same breath — granted the accused anticipatory bail on conditions to be fixed by the trial court.
How the matter reached the Supreme Court
The petitioner faced prosecution in Crime No. 441/2025 of Police Station Pachore, District Rajgarh, Madhya Pradesh, for offences under Sections 64(1), 331(2) and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Sections 3(1)(w)(i), 3(1)(w)(ii) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. He approached the Supreme Court seeking anticipatory bail. In the meantime, the Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Misc. Criminal Case No. 15763 of 2026, quashed the complaint under its inherent powers on the basis that the parties had arrived at a settlement.
That sequence troubled the Court. In an earlier order of 3 September 2026 it recorded that it was slightly perturbed, given the seriousness of the offence, and called for the record, examining the authorities on which the High Court had acted.
The limits of quashing on compromise
The judgment of 26 October 2026 draws the line firmly. The Court held that it could not approve the quashing of a case involving serious offences on a mere settlement. Rape is non-compoundable, and quashing such a prosecution on compromise would exceed the jurisdiction recognised in the settled line of authority — the Court distinguished the decisions the High Court had invoked, including Narinder Singh, Gian Singh and Shambhu Kharwar, as cases concerning disputes of a predominantly personal, civil or commercial character.
The principle is not new, but its restatement is emphatic: the inherent power to quash is not a private compounding mechanism for offences the legislature has made non-compoundable. For heinous offences, the state’s interest in prosecution does not dissolve because the parties have signed a compromise deed.
The victim’s statement on coercion
What gives the judgment its edge is the Court’s direct engagement with the victim. Through video conferencing arranged by the District Legal Services Authority, Rajgarh, she told the Court that she had been coerced into the settlement, was not prepared to settle, and stood by her complaint. The Court directed that the truth of the allegations be examined at trial and recorded its concern in both directions — about false complaints instituted in the hope of a financial settlement, and equally about settlements extracted from complainants through coercion.
The orders passed
What practitioners should take from it
For the defence, the decision confirms that a quashing petition built on a settlement is a fragile foundation where the offence is grave: even a successful order in the High Court can be undone, and the better-protected route may be to seek anticipatory or regular bail and contest the trial. For complainants, the judgment shows that a settlement signed under pressure is not the end of the road — the Supreme Court was prepared to hear the victim directly and to restore the prosecution. And for both sides, the grant of anticipatory bail alongside the restoration of the case illustrates the modern calibration: liberty is protected through bail conditions, while the allegation itself goes to trial where it belongs.
The observations in the judgment are confined to the question of quashing; the Court made clear that the truthfulness of the allegations remains a matter for the trial court.
Frequently Asked Questions
What offences were involved in Gopal Lodhi?
The case, Crime No. 441/2025 of Police Station Pachore, District Rajgarh (M.P.), involved Sections 64(1), 331(2) and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — rape, house-breaking and criminal intimidation — along with Sections 3(1)(w)(i), 3(1)(w)(ii) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Section 64 BNS corresponds broadly to Section 376 IPC.
Why did the Supreme Court set aside the quashing?
The High Court had quashed the complaint under its inherent powers (Section 528 BNSS) on the footing that the parties had settled. The Supreme Court held it could not approve the quashing of a case involving serious, non-compoundable offences such as rape on a mere settlement, and found that the precedents the High Court relied upon concerned personal, civil or less serious disputes.
What did the victim tell the Supreme Court?
Speaking through video conferencing arranged by the District Legal Services Authority, Rajgarh, the victim stated that she had been coerced into the settlement, that she was not ready for one, and that her complaint was truthful. The Court said these assertions must be tested at trial, and it expressed no opinion on the merits of the allegations.
How could the Court grant anticipatory bail while restoring the case?
The Court observed it was inclined to grant anticipatory bail but could not do so while the quashing order stood, since there was then no live prosecution. Having set aside the quashing, it directed that the petitioner be released on anticipatory bail on conditions imposed by the trial court, subject to cooperation with the investigation and appearance when summoned.