In Riya Fokir v. The State (Crl.O.P. No. 32399 of 2026, decided 10 November 2026), Justice N. Ramesh of the Madras High Court dismissed a second regular bail petition under Section 483 BNSS in a trafficking-and-prostitution prosecution to which Section 6 of the POCSO Act was added once the victim’s age was recorded as fifteen. The accused’s answer — a second Bangladeshi birth certificate said to show the victim was an adult — framed the question the Court declined to decide: whose document is true? That, the Court held, is what trials are for.
The case in one view
| Case | Riya Fokir v. The State rep. by the Inspector of Police, Crl.O.P. No. 32399 of 2026 (Crime No. 10 of 2026) |
|---|---|
| Court | High Court of Judicature at Madras, Justice N. Ramesh |
| Decided | 10 November 2026 |
| Posture | Second bail petition under Section 483 BNSS; first petition dismissed 28 September 2026; arrest 30 August 2026, custody from 31 August 2026 |
| Outcome | Dismissed; final report to be filed at the earliest (Section 193(2) BNSS); liberty to seek bail before the Special Court thereafter |
The prosecution’s case
The investigation concerns trafficking and forced prostitution. The victim’s age was recorded as fifteen, which transformed the case: Section 6 of the POCSO Act — aggravated penetrative sexual assault, carrying a minimum of twenty years — entered the array of charges. The victim’s statement under Section 183 BNSS implicated the petitioner specifically: arranging her passage, lodging her, and forcing her into prostitution. The record also contained the petitioner’s own admission that she travelled between Bangladesh and Kolkata procuring girls for spa establishments.
The defence’s document — and why it failed at this stage
The petitioner produced a second Bangladeshi birth certificate to contend the victim was an adult, which would strip the POCSO charge of its foundation. Justice Ramesh declined to adjudicate between the rival certificates, anchoring the refusal in the Supreme Court’s ruling in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 INSC 47: the victim’s age is a matter of trial, not of bail. The logic is institutional. A bail court takes the prosecution record as it prima facie stands; it has neither the machinery nor the mandate to test the provenance of foreign documents, summon issuing authorities, or resolve genuineness. An accused who disputes age must do so where evidence is led.
The structure of the refusal
The practice point: age at the bail stage
Age disputes recur across POCSO bail practice, and the line the courts hold is consistent. The prosecution’s recorded age — from school records, municipal registers or ossification where documents fail — governs the prima facie view at bail. Defence material contesting it earns consideration at charge, in a juvenility-style inquiry where applicable, or at trial, but it rarely unlocks bail by itself. Counsel advising an accused in this position should calibrate accordingly: the realistic near-term objectives are expedition of the final report, bail before the Special Court once investigation closes, and meticulous preservation of the age-related documents — with certification and chain of custody — for the stage at which they can actually be weighed.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why could the age dispute not be examined at the bail hearing?
Relying on State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 INSC 47, the Court held that determination of the victim's age is a matter of trial and not for the bail stage. Conflicting certificates require evidence — proof of issuance, custody and genuineness — which a bail court cannot conduct.
What material weighed against the petitioner?
The victim's statement under Section 183 BNSS squarely implicated the petitioner — arranging her passage, lodging her and forcing her into prostitution — and the petitioner's own admission of travelling between Bangladesh and Kolkata to procure girls was on record.
Was the custody period not a ground?
Just over two months of custody was held not long against the gravity of an offence carrying a 20-year minimum sentence. Custody-length arguments gather force with time and trial delay, neither of which had accrued.
What directions accompanied the dismissal?
The police were directed to file the final report at the earliest, in terms of Section 193(2) BNSS, with liberty to the petitioner to seek bail before the Special Court thereafter. The refusal is a postponement to the proper stage, not a permanent bar.