In Netram Kumar v. The State of NCT of Delhi, CRL.A. 573/2026, decided on 12 August 2026, Justice Madhu Jain of the Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal of a school drawing teacher convicted of sexually assaulting a 12-year-old student inside the school. The judgment affirms a five-year sentence imposed by the Special Court (POCSO), Shahdara, and is a careful worked example of three recurring questions in POCSO trials: how a child witness’s testimony is weighed, when the statutory presumption under Section 29 operates, and what is expected of the institution where the abuse occurred.
The case in brief
The complaint was made on 11 August 2016: a Class VI student told her family that her drawing teacher had touched her inappropriately on more than one occasion within the school — once when she was distributing toffees on her birthday, and again in the staff room in July 2016. The FIR invoked Sections 354 and 354A IPC and Section 10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — aggravated sexual assault, the aggravation arising from the offender’s position as a teacher. The school principal was arrayed as co-accused under Section 21(2) POCSO for discouraging disclosure of the complaint.
After a trial that ran nearly a decade, the Special Judge (POCSO), Shahdara convicted the teacher on 16 April 2026 and sentenced him to five years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine, along with compensation of ₹3,00,000 to the victim. The appeal to the High Court followed.
How the High Court weighed the child’s evidence
The defence attacked the prosecutrix’s testimony on discrepancies — dates, the exact spot, sequence of events. Justice Madhu Jain rejected the challenge, finding the deposition “consistent on the material particulars” and such as “inspires confidence”. The discrepancies pressed were peripheral: they did not touch the identity of the offender, the nature of the acts, or the school setting in which they occurred. The child’s elder sister corroborated the circumstances in which the child disclosed the abuse at home, and the medical and documentary record was consistent with the prosecution case.
The approach is orthodox and worth remembering on both sides of the aisle: a child witness is neither presumptively unreliable nor beyond scrutiny. The test is whether the core of the account withstands cross-examination. Defence strategies built entirely on peripheral inconsistencies fail precisely because courts are instructed not to treat children as trained chroniclers of dates and dimensions.
The Section 29 presumption, correctly sequenced
On the statutory presumption, the judgment is equally instructive. The trial court had first satisfied itself of the foundational facts — the victim’s age, her credible account of the assaults, the appellant’s position as her teacher — and only then invoked Section 29 of the POCSO Act, which presumes commission of the offence and casts the burden of rebuttal on the accused. The appellant’s defence, a bare denial coupled with a suggestion of false implication, did not discharge that burden. The High Court approved the sequence: foundation first, presumption second, rebuttal third.
What the Court said about the school
The most quoted portion of the judgment concerns the institution rather than the offender. The evidence indicated that the principal had told the child not to carry such matters to her parents. The Court described such conduct as deeply disturbing, holding that a child who complains of abuse must not be made to feel that she has erred by speaking, and that educational institutions must ensure children know their rights and are encouraged to report conduct that causes them fear, discomfort or insecurity.
Obligations the judgment underscores for schools: complaints by children must be received, recorded and reported, not managed into silence; Section 19 POCSO makes reporting mandatory for any person with knowledge of the offence; Section 21 makes failure to report punishable, including for institutional heads; and internal “handling” of a complaint is no substitute for setting the statutory machinery in motion.
The outcome
The appeal was dismissed and the conviction and sentence — five years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 10 POCSO with fine, and the compensation award — were affirmed. For practitioners, Netram Kumar is a compact restatement of settled ground: the sufficiency of a reliable child witness, the disciplined operation of Section 29, and the accountability of those who run the institutions where children spend their days. For schools in Delhi, it is a warning that suppression of a complaint is itself a matter for the criminal court.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a conviction rest on the sole testimony of a child victim?
Yes, if the testimony is found reliable. Courts treat a child victim's deposition like that of any other witness: it must inspire confidence and be consistent on material particulars. Minor discrepancies about dates or peripheral details do not discredit it. Corroboration is a matter of prudence, not an invariable legal requirement, and here the sibling's testimony about the disclosure supported the child's account.
What does Section 29 of the POCSO Act presume?
Once the prosecution establishes the foundational facts — the age of the child and the circumstances of the offence through credible evidence — Section 29 presumes that the accused committed the offence, and the burden shifts to the accused to rebut it. The presumption does not dispense with the prosecution's initial burden; it operates only after the foundational facts are proved.
What offences were involved and what is the position after 1 July 2024?
The incidents of 2016 were tried under Sections 354 and 354A of the Indian Penal Code with Section 10 of the POCSO Act (aggravated sexual assault, as the offender was a teacher). For occurrences on or after 1 July 2024, the corresponding IPC provisions are Sections 74 and 75 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; the POCSO Act continues to apply unchanged to child victims.
Can a school official be prosecuted for suppressing a child's complaint?
Yes. Section 19 of the POCSO Act obliges anyone with knowledge of an offence to report it, and Section 21 penalises failure to report or record it. In this case the school principal was separately charged under Section 21(2), and the High Court observed that a child who speaks up must never be made to feel that she has done something wrong.