In Ali Khan v. State of NCT of Delhi (CRL.A. 1012/2025, decided 3 November 2026), Justice Madhu Jain of the High Court of Delhi dismissed the appeal of a man convicted under Section 6 of the POCSO Act for the repeated sexual assault of a thirteen-year-old girl. The appellant was the mother’s “dharam bhai” who lived with the family — which is precisely what made the offence aggravated: Section 5(l) covers repeated assault, and Section 5(n) reaches an offender living in the same household in a position of trust. The twenty-year sentence and victim compensation of Rs 10.5 lakh were affirmed.
The case in one view
| Case | Ali Khan v. State of NCT of Delhi, CRL.A. 1012/2025 |
|---|---|
| Court | High Court of Delhi, Madhu Jain J |
| Decided | 3 November 2026 (reserved 27 October 2026) |
| Provisions | Sections 376, 363, 506 IPC r/w Section 6 POCSO (Sections 5(l), 5(n)); appeal under Section 415(2) BNSS |
| Outcome | Appeal dismissed; conviction, 20 years’ RI and Rs 10.5 lakh compensation upheld |
The background
A thirteen-year-old girl went missing from her home in March 2021 and was traced twelve days later in the company of the appellant — her mother’s “dharam bhai”, who lived with the family. Her age was proved through school records. She alleged repeated sexual assault, beating and threats. The trial court convicted the appellant and imposed twenty years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 6 POCSO with concurrent sentences on the IPC counts and victim compensation of Rs 10,50,000.
The sole-testimony standard
The appeal pressed inconsistencies and investigation defects: the delay in the missing report, a date discrepancy in a counselling record, the delayed Section 164 statement, seizure-memo mismatches, the absence of CCTV footage, a sister not examined, a nil-injury MLC, and a false-implication theory. The court’s answer came from the settled standard:
From the judgment, quoting the Supreme Court: “The conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence.” On the record, the court found the victim’s testimony “sufficiently cogent”.
Her account was consistent across the Section 161 statement, the Section 164 statement and her deposition. Nirmal Premkumar — where the Supreme Court declined to act on shaky sole testimony — was distinguished on its facts; Manga Singh and Phool Singh supplied the governing rule. Investigative lapses, the court held, do not discard otherwise reliable substantive evidence.
Why the trust element mattered
The aggravating clauses did independent work. Section 5(l) was met by the repetition of the assaults; Section 5(n) by the appellant’s position — a person living in the same household, treated as family. The provision recognises that the household offender both enjoys access and commands silence, and the twenty-year minimum that follows under Section 6 reflects that legislative judgment. Given the gravity, the court declined to interfere with sentence, maintaining also the compensation and the set-off for custody undergone.
What the decision means in practice
The wider frame
The “dharam bhai” of this case joins a long, grim catalogue of household figures in POCSO dockets — uncles, tenants, family friends — whose access flows from trust. The statute’s aggravation scheme, and the courts’ steady application of the sole-testimony standard, together answer the evidentiary reality of such cases: they happen behind closed doors, and the child’s word, if it withstands scrutiny, is the case. This judgment is a current and complete illustration of that framework in operation in the Delhi High Court.
Frequently Asked Questions
What makes a POCSO offence "aggravated" under Sections 5(l) and 5(n)?
Section 5 lists circumstances that elevate penetrative sexual assault to its aggravated form. Clause (l) covers repeated commission of the offence, and clause (n) covers an offender who, being a relative or a person living in the same or shared household, commits the assault — capturing the breach of domestic trust. Both were established here, attracting Section 6's enhanced punishment.
Can a POCSO conviction rest on the victim's sole testimony?
Yes. Quoting State of H.P. v. Manga Singh, the court reiterated that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. The victim's account was consistent across her statement to the police, her Section 164 statement and her deposition, and the court found it sufficiently cogent.
Do defects in the investigation help the defence?
Not where the substantive evidence is reliable. The defence catalogued lapses — a delayed missing report, record discrepancies, a delayed Section 164 statement, no CCTV collection, a witness not examined. The court held that investigative lapses do not discard otherwise reliable evidence, a principle long settled in sexual-offence jurisprudence.
Could the 20-year sentence have been reduced?
No. Twenty years is the statutory minimum for Section 6 as it stood at the time of this 2021 offence, following the 2019 amendment. Given the gravity — repeated assaults on a thirteen-year-old by a household figure — the court declined to interfere, and also maintained the compensation of Rs 10,50,000.