Two questions dominate most POCSO appeals: can the child’s testimony alone sustain the conviction, and was the sentence imposed under the correct avatar of the statute? In Dilip Kumar @ Tinu v. State (NCT of Delhi) (CRL.A. 699/2024, decided on 6 November 2026), Justice Madhu Jain of the Delhi High Court answered both. The conviction of a neighbourhood acquaintance for aggravated penetrative sexual assault on an eight-year-old boy was affirmed on the strength of the child’s evidence — but the 25-year sentence was reduced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment, because the offence predated the 16 August 2019 amendment that raised Section 6’s minimum from ten to twenty years.
The case in outline
FIR No. 88/2019 at Police Station Kotla Mubarakpur recorded that a boy of about eight had been sexually assaulted twice, roughly eight days apart, by a man known in the neighbourhood, who threatened to kill the child’s mother if he spoke. The matter surfaced only when the family noticed the child bleeding while passing stool; a confrontation followed, and the police were called. The Fast Track Special Court (POCSO) at Saket convicted the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 377 and 506 IPC, sentencing him in March 2024 to twenty-five years’ rigorous imprisonment on the POCSO count with ₹7.5 lakh compensation to the child.
On appeal, the defence pressed the familiar arsenal: variations in the child’s accounts, uncertainty about the place of occurrence, a site plan prepared at the uncle’s instance, inconclusive medical evidence, unexamined independent witnesses, and a motive of false implication rooted in enmity with the child’s uncle.
How the Court tested the child’s evidence
Reliability, not corroboration
Applying the settled line of Supreme Court authority on child witnesses, the Court held that a conviction can rest on a child’s testimony if it is credible and free of material infirmity; corroboration is caution’s counsel, not a legal precondition.
Peripheral v. material discrepancies
Differences about the exact date, the precise step on the staircase and who in the family learnt first were held peripheral. The Court found no mutually destructive versions of the core allegation.
Medical evidence in context
No injury was found on examination — but two weeks had passed and no swab was taken. The doctor did not rule out penetration, so the medical record did not contradict the child.
Missing witnesses, no adverse inference
The relatives not examined were not eyewitnesses. With the child himself cross-examined at length, their absence did not dent the prosecution.
School records proved the boy was under twelve, attracting Section 5(m); with the foundational facts established, the Section 29 presumption operated, and the enmity theory was too slender to rebut it. The precedents relied on by the defence were distinguished as cases of genuinely contradictory testimony without corroboration.
The sentencing turn: which Section 6?
The decisive sentencing question was temporal. Parliament amended Section 6 with effect from 16 August 2019, raising the minimum sentence from ten to twenty years. These assaults preceded the amendment. Following the Supreme Court’s approach in State of U.P. v. Sonu Kushwaha, the Court applied the unamended provision:
Unamended Section 6 (pre-16.08.2019)
Rigorous imprisonment of not less than ten years, extendable to imprisonment for life, with fine.
Amended Section 6 (from 16.08.2019)
Rigorous imprisonment of not less than twenty years, extendable to imprisonment for life meaning the remainder of natural life, with fine — and death in specified cases.
Within the unamended range, the Court weighed the appellant’s age of about twenty-two at the time, his clean record and long incarceration against the victim’s tender age and the threats employed, concluding that ten years’ rigorous imprisonment “would adequately meet the ends of justice”. The fine, the concurrent eighteen-month sentence under Section 506 IPC, and the ₹7.5 lakh compensation all stood; no separate sentence followed under Section 377 IPC by operation of Section 42 POCSO, and set-off for custody already undergone was allowed.
Why the decision matters
- Conviction and sentence are separate battles. An appeal that cannot shake the child’s testimony may still succeed substantially on the applicable sentencing regime.
- Date of offence controls the statute. In POCSO prosecutions spanning the 2019 amendment, counsel on both sides must fix the date of occurrence with precision — decades of liberty can turn on it.
- Defence theories need evidence. Enmity and false implication remain arguable, but against the Section 29 presumption they require proof, not suggestion.
- Victim compensation survives sentence modification. Reduction of the prison term left the ₹7.5 lakh award untouched — the two operate on different axes.
Practice note: Where the charge-sheet alleges incidents “about a month before” a 2019 FIR, the amendment date of 16 August 2019 becomes a live issue at framing of charge, not an afterthought at sentencing. Trial courts sentencing under the amended Section 6 for pre-amendment acts commit an error that appellate courts will correct — but only if the record fixes the timeline clearly.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a POCSO conviction rest on the child's testimony alone?
Yes, if the testimony is reliable and free from material infirmity. Following Supreme Court precedent, the Court reiterated that corroboration of a child witness is a matter of prudence, not an inflexible rule. The eight-year-old's account was consistent on the core incident; variations about the exact date, the precise spot on the staircase and the order in which relatives learnt of it were treated as peripheral.
Why was the sentence reduced from 25 years to 10?
The assaults occurred before 16 August 2019, when the amendment enhancing Section 6's minimum sentence from ten to twenty years came into force. Penal amendments are not retrospective, so the unamended Section 6 — minimum ten years, extendable to life — governed. Weighing the appellant's young age at the time, clean antecedents and years in custody against the gravity of the offence, the Court found ten years' rigorous imprisonment adequate.
What is the Section 29 presumption and how did it operate here?
Section 29 of the POCSO Act presumes the accused committed the offence once the prosecution establishes the foundational facts. Here the child's testimony, his age proved through school records, and the surrounding evidence laid that foundation; the defence of false implication over an old quarrel with the child's uncle was found too thin to rebut the presumption.
Why was no separate sentence passed under Section 377 IPC?
Section 42 of the POCSO Act directs that where an act is an offence under both POCSO and the IPC, the offender is punished under the provision carrying the greater punishment. The conviction under Section 377 IPC stood alongside Section 6 POCSO, but punishment flowed from Section 6 alone; only the criminal intimidation conviction under Section 506 IPC carried its own concurrent sentence.