In State of Tamil Nadu v. Chandran, R.T.(MD) No. 05 of 2026 with Crl.A.(MD) No. 689 of 2026 (decided 8 September 2026), a Division Bench of Justice N. Anand Venkatesh and Justice K.K. Ramakrishnan of the Madras High Court, Madurai Bench, declined to confirm a death sentence and acquitted a man convicted of sexually assaulting five children under ten. The Bench found the victims' accounts fundamentally contradictory, bearing clear indications of tutoring, and the alleged occurrence inherently improbable; it also found the trial itself deficient in fair-trial guarantees. The judgment is a searching restatement of how courts must weigh child testimony in POCSO cases — protective of genuine victims, but unwilling to let the gravity of an accusation substitute for proof.
The case that produced a death sentence
The prosecution alleged that on 4 February 2024 the accused lured five children, all under ten, into his house with the promise of phone games and snacks, and sexually assaulted them. The special court convicted him and imposed the death penalty. Under the mandatory confirmation procedure, the record travelled to the High Court as a referred trial, heard together with the convict's appeal.
Where the case fell apart
The standard the Bench applied
"The greater the severity of the punishment, the greater is the obligation upon the prosecution to establish the foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt. Graver the crime, greater should be the standard of proof... Suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof."
The Bench also grounded its interference in Article 21: the trial court had allowed the gravity of the accusations to overwhelm the accused's fair-trial rights, including effective legal representation and meaningful cross-examination. An acquittal in such circumstances, the court observed, "is not an act of indulgence; it is the command of the rule of law."
Why this matters in Delhi practice
Delhi's special courts try a heavy POCSO docket, and the same fault-lines recur: delayed disclosures triggered by third parties, family enmity in the background, and medical evidence that merely repeats the history given. The judgment supplies a disciplined framework for both sides — the prosecution must build corroboration and rule out coaching contemporaneously, while the defence should map every contradiction to the genesis of the case rather than cataloguing trivial omissions. It also reinforces that statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act presuppose proof of foundational facts; they are not a substitute for a credible case.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is a referred trial?
When a sessions court imposes a death sentence, the sentence cannot be executed unless the High Court confirms it. The record is submitted to the High Court as a referred trial, heard by a Division Bench along with the convict's appeal, and the High Court reappraises the entire evidence for itself rather than merely reviewing for error.
Can a child's sole testimony support a conviction?
Yes — a child witness's reliable testimony can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires confidence and is free of embellishment. But children are recognised as susceptible to tutoring, so where the testimony appears coached or carries material discrepancies, courts insist on corroboration before acting on it.
What indicated tutoring in this case?
The five victims gave irreconcilable accounts of how they came to the accused's house; the disclosures surfaced only after a school awareness programme and a nine-day delay; the families and the accused had admitted prior enmity; and the medical evidence recorded no injuries, resting solely on the children's statements.
Does the statutory presumption under Section 29 POCSO not apply?
The presumption operates only after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts of the offence. Where the primary evidence is itself unreliable, the presumption cannot fill the gap — the burden of proving foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt never shifts from the prosecution, however grave the charge.