An intra-court appeal is not a second trial of the writ petition. In R. Saravanan v. Periyar University, 2026 INSC 1136, decided on 16 October 2026, a bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar restored a Single Judge’s order quashing the removal of a university Deputy Registrar, holding that the Division Bench in the Letters Patent appeal had exceeded its limited role by re-appreciating evidence and drawing its own inferences. The decision sharpens the standard that governs LPAs and writ appeals across High Courts, including the Delhi High Court.
The disciplinary case
The appellant joined Periyar University as Assistant Registrar in May 2000 and rose to Deputy Registrar. Following a complaint about his assets, a preliminary inquiry and then a One-man Commission examined a set of charges. Three were held proved: that he influenced the grant of affiliation to a college run by his wife; that a house standing in his mother’s name was really his acquisition; and that he had purchased a car beyond his known sources of income. The Syndicate accepted the report and removed him from service with effect from 27 July 2013.
A learned Single Judge allowed his writ petition, finding the conclusions perverse because they rested on no evidence — the affiliation charge, for instance, was held proved on the reasoning that his influence “could not be ruled out”. In the Letters Patent appeal, a Division Bench reversed the Single Judge in 2019 and restored the removal. The Supreme Court has now restored the writ court’s order.
The appellate discipline the judgment enforces
What the Division Bench did
Re-appreciated the material, drew adverse inferences from the employee’s failure to produce title documents, and substituted its own assessment for the writ court’s on charges the inquiry had supported with surmise.
What an LPA bench may do
Correct a writ-court decision only where its findings are demonstrably erroneous — a glaring mistake apparent on the record. A decision that is otherwise just and reasonable stands, even if some error of fact or law can be pointed out.
Three strands of reasoning
No evidence means perversity
A finding unsupported by any material is perverse, and perversity is a recognised ground for certiorari. Suspicion, however strong, and inferences built on “cannot be ruled out” reasoning are not evidence.
Discretion deserves deference
The writ court’s discretionary assessment commands restraint from the appellate bench. The LPA exists to correct demonstrable error, not to offer the losing side a fresh round of fact-finding.
Alternative remedy is no absolute bar
Exhaustion of statutory remedies is a self-imposed rule of convenience. Where removal from service visits severe consequences, the writ court may act directly.
Relevance for Delhi practice
In the Delhi High Court, intra-court appeals from writ-court judgments travel as LPAs, and the standard articulated here will be the touchstone: an appellant must identify a demonstrable, glaring error, not merely argue the evidence afresh. The decision pairs naturally with the same week’s ruling in Sanjay Prasad v. Madhusudan Dwivedi, which examines when an intra-court appeal is maintainable at all; together they map both the gate and the ground of writ appeals.
- For appellants: frame the challenge around perversity, jurisdictional error or a glaring misreading of the record — a “different possible view” argument is designed to fail.
- For respondents: defend the writ court’s discretion as such; the appellate bench need not agree with every line of reasoning to affirm the result.
- For disciplinary authorities: inquiry findings must rest on legal evidence. Conclusions phrased as possibilities invite certiorari, and a removal built on them may not survive.
This article is for general information only and is not legal advice. The judgment should be read in full before being relied upon in any proceeding.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the standard for interference in a Letters Patent appeal?
The Court held that a Letters Patent Bench can review findings of fact in an appropriate case but should be slow to disturb the writ court's exercise of discretion. Interference is justified only where the findings are demonstrably erroneous and the mistake is glaring on the face of the record — not merely because the appellate bench would have taken a different view of the same material.
When is a finding "perverse"?
A finding not supported by any material on record is perverse. The judgment reiterates that a conclusion based on no evidence raises a pure question of law and is open to challenge in certiorari, which is why the Single Judge was entitled to quash disciplinary findings that rested on inference and surmise rather than proof.
Did the employee have to exhaust statutory remedies first?
The Court restated that the rule requiring exhaustion of alternative remedies is one of convenience and discretion, not a rigid bar on the writ jurisdiction. Given that removal from service carries severe civil consequences, the writ court could properly entertain the challenge despite the existence of other remedies.
What was the final outcome?
The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench judgment of 29 August 2019 in the Letters Patent appeal and restored the Single Judge's order in the writ petition, which had quashed the removal. The disciplinary findings on the three charges were held to rest on conjecture rather than evidence. No order was made as to costs.