In Vikram Sachdeva v. Naveen Kumar Dhingra (RC.REV. 338/2026, decided on 10 September 2026), the Delhi High Court dismissed a tenant's revision under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, upholding the Additional Rent Controller's refusal of leave to defend in a bona fide requirement eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e). The judgment consolidates the law on the tenant's most common defence — that the landlord has other property — and on the narrow supervisory character of rent revision.
The Proceeding
The landlord sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act for a bona fide commercial requirement. The tenant applied for leave to defend, resting principally on the plea that the landlord possessed reasonably suitable alternative accommodation and had concealed other premises. The Additional Rent Controller declined leave; the tenant invoked the High Court\'s revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-B(8).
The Standards the Judgment Restates
The Ground Floor Logic
Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar\'s reasoning on suitability bears noting for commercial tenancies: ground floor premises are inherently more suitable for commercial purposes than upper floors owing to customer accessibility, and a court will not compel a landlord to relocate a proposed commercial use upstairs in the name of alternative accommodation. Comparisons of suitability are functional, not arithmetical — floor area alone does not equate premises.
Revision Is Not a Second Trial
The Court reaffirmed that the jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) is supervisory: it corrects manifest illegality, jurisdictional error and perversity. It does not re-weigh the material to substitute a different plausible view. Tenants who treat the revision as a fresh hearing on facts consistently fail, as the petition did here.
Practical Guidance
- For tenants: the leave-to-defend affidavit is the trial. Investigate the landlord\'s holdings before filing — municipal records, sale deeds, rent agreements — and plead specifics: which property, where, its vacancy status, and why it suits the pleaded need.
- For landlords: disclose owned premises candidly with reasons for unsuitability; a petition that anticipates the alternative-accommodation plea and answers it with particulars is substantially harder to resist.
- For both: Section 25-B is a summary procedure by design. The dispute is ordinarily won at the affidavit stage, and revisional review will not repair what the affidavits failed to establish.
This article is for general information only and is not legal advice or a solicitation. The cited judgment should be read in full from the official record.
Frequently Asked Questions
What must a tenant show to raise a triable issue on alternative accommodation?
Specific particulars: that the landlord holds title to the other premises, that they were vacant and actually available at the relevant time, and that they are reasonably suitable for the pleaded requirement compared with the tenanted premises. Bare assertions that "the landlord owns other properties" do not earn leave to defend.
Can the court tell the landlord which property to use?
No. The Court reiterated that the landlord is the absolute owner and the best judge of which property to utilise for his requirement. Courts test the bona fides of the requirement; they do not redesign the landlord's affairs.
Why did the ground floor point matter?
The requirement was commercial, and the Court noted that ground floor premises are inherently more suitable for commercial use than upper floors because of customer accessibility. A tenant cannot compel the landlord to shift his business upstairs and call that an alternative.
How wide is the High Court's power under Section 25-B(8)?
It is supervisory and revisional, not appellate. Interference lies only for manifest illegality, jurisdictional error or perversity — not because another view of the material is theoretically possible.