An acquittal is not the end of a criminal case while the State's right to seek leave to appeal survives. In State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) v. Bajrang Bali Singh (CRL.L.P. 435/2016, reserved on 5 October and pronounced on 13 October 2026), Justice Saurabh Banerjee of the Delhi High Court granted the State leave under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to appeal a 2016 acquittal under Sections 9(m) and 10 of the POCSO Act and allied IPC provisions — directing the Registry to register the matter as a criminal appeal.
The complaint and the acquittal
In November 2014, a ten-year-old girl told police that the respondent, who lived in the same premises, touched her while she washed utensils on a balcony; she raised an alarm and her mother intervened. Charges were framed under the POCSO Act and the IPC, the respondent pleaded not guilty, and the Sessions Court acquitted him in February 2016. The trial court\'s reasons were a catalogue of classic acquittal grounds in child sexual assault cases: contradictions between the child\'s court testimony and her prior statement before the Magistrate under Section 164 CrPC, inconsistencies between the child and her mother, doubt that the child\'s sole testimony could sustain conviction, the suggestion of false implication arising from a quarrel, and the absence of independent witnesses.
A decade at the leave stage
The State\'s leave petition was filed in 2016 and decided in 2026 — a reminder that appeals against acquittal move slowly, but that time alone does not defeat them. Section 378(3) CrPC requires the State to obtain leave of the High Court before its appeal against acquittal is entertained. The provision functions as a filter: acquittals carry a reinforced presumption of innocence, so the State must first show the High Court that there is something worth hearing.
The threshold: prima facie, not probable reversal
What leave does NOT require
Proof that the acquittal is perverse; a conclusion that the appeal will succeed; a full re-appreciation of the evidence; the elimination of every view favouring the accused.
What leave DOES require
A prima facie case or arguable points on the record — enough to show the appeal deserves a full hearing on merits, per Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar and Manoj Rameshlal Chhabriya.
Applying that standard, the Court found the victim\'s deposition and her mother\'s evidence sufficient to raise arguable questions. Importantly, it flagged two legal issues the appeal must confront: whether minor discrepancies between a child\'s statements genuinely discredit her, and how the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act — which presumes commission of the offence once foundational facts are shown, unless the contrary is proved — bears on an acquittal reasoned largely on the absence of corroboration.
Why Section 29 matters in appeals against POCSO acquittals
The POCSO Act inverts part of the ordinary evidentiary structure. Once the prosecution establishes the foundational facts of the offence charged under Sections 3, 5, 7 or 9, Section 29 obliges the Special Court to presume guilt unless the defence rebuts it. An acquittal that proceeds as if the entire burden lay on the prosecution throughout — demanding independent corroboration of a child witness as a rule — is vulnerable in appeal. The Court\'s express reference to the presumption signals that this will be a central question when the appeal is heard.
Practical notes
For the defence, a leave grant is a signal to prepare for a full merits hearing: the record of the child\'s two statements, the cross-examination, and the investigating officer\'s evidence on the presence or absence of other residents will all be re-read by the appellate bench. For complainants and the prosecution, the case shows that an acquittal built on discrepancies is not immune from scrutiny — but also that the appellate process is measured, with the respondent\'s acquittal standing until the appeal is decided. The appeal now proceeds before the Roster Bench, the leave petition having been directed to be registered as a criminal appeal.
Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, appeals against acquittal are governed by Section 419, which corresponds to Section 378 CrPC; this petition, instituted in 2016, was decided under the former Code. Nothing in this article comments on the merits of the pending appeal.
Frequently Asked Questions
What had the trial court held?
The Additional Sessions Judge, North-West, Rohini Courts acquitted the respondent on 10 February 2016 of charges under Sections 9(m)/10 POCSO and Sections 354, 354-A and 506 IPC arising out of a 2014 complaint by a 10-year-old girl. The acquittal rested on contradictions between the victim's testimony and her Section 164 CrPC statement, inconsistencies with her mother's account, the view that the child's sole testimony was insufficient, and the possibility of false implication.
What is the test for granting leave under Section 378(3)?
Relying on State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar and Manoj Rameshlal Chhabriya v. Mahesh Prakash Ahuja, the Court held that at the leave stage the High Court examines only whether a prima facie case or arguable points exist. It does not weigh whether the acquittal will ultimately be set aside; a detailed merits evaluation belongs to the appeal itself.
Why did the Court find arguable points here?
The victim's testimony and her mother's statement, read together, made out a prima facie case. Whether the discrepancies truly discredited the witnesses, whether independent corroboration was necessary at all, and the effect of the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act were all questions requiring fuller examination in appeal.
Does granting leave mean the respondent is guilty?
No. The Court expressly did not decide the merits. Leave only opens the appellate door: the acquittal remains in force, the presumption of innocence is reinforced by it, and the appeal will be decided on the full record. The matter was listed before the Roster Bench on 28 October 2026.