Section 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is the engine room of the statute: nearly every DV case begins with an application for interim orders under it. Most of those applications seek monetary relief under Section 20 — maintenance, rent, medical expenses. But applications increasingly also ask for compensation under Section 22 at the interim stage, for injuries including mental torture and emotional distress. Whether that is legally possible is a question the statute answers less clearly than either side would like, and it deserves careful handling rather than reflex.
The statutory map
The DV Act separates its reliefs by function. Section 18 protects (restraint orders); Section 19 houses (residence orders); Section 20 funds (monetary relief for expenses incurred and losses suffered); Section 21 arranges custody; Section 22 compensates (damages for injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress). Section 23 then supplies the temporal dimension: subsection (1) is the general interim power, and subsection (2) permits even ex parte orders, on affidavit, across the named sections — Section 22 included.
Reading Section 23(2) honestly
An honest reading accepts both halves of the picture. Parliament did include Section 22 in the ex parte interim provision, and a Magistrate therefore has the power to pass an interim order referable to it; a submission that interim compensation is wholly incompetent overstates the position. But power and propriety are different things. Compensation for mental torture and emotional distress cannot be meaningfully quantified on affidavits at the threshold of a contested case: the extent of injury, causation, and the respondent’s role are precisely what the trial will determine. An interim award of damages risks prejudging the central issue — whether domestic violence occurred at all — and creates recovery complications if the application ultimately fails.
The practical middle path
For respondents
A respondent facing an interim compensation prayer should resist it on structure rather than sympathy: point out that the claim, as framed, requires findings the court cannot yet record; that the applicant’s immediate needs are fully addressable under Section 20; and that any interim figure for distress would be arbitrary by definition. Simultaneously, contest the Section 20 arithmetic on evidence — income affidavits cut both ways, and inflated interim claims deflate quickly when tested against documents. If an interim compensation order is nonetheless passed, Section 29 provides the appellate route to the Court of Session within thirty days.
Drafting pointers
Applicants: separate the heads of relief in the interim application — one consolidated “lump sum” prayer invites the objection that compensation is being smuggled in at the interim stage.
Keep a contemporaneous loss file: prescriptions, bills, photographs, police complaints. Section 20 interim relief is won on paper.
Respondents: file the income affidavit honestly and early; credibility on money matters colours the Magistrate’s view of everything else.
Both sides: remember that interim orders are alterable under Section 25(2) on changed circumstances — neither victory nor defeat at this stage is permanent.
Frequently Asked Questions
What does Section 23 actually say?
Section 23(1) empowers the Magistrate to grant such interim order as he deems just and proper in any proceeding before him. Section 23(2) goes further: on a prima facie disclosure of domestic violence, an ex parte order may be passed on the basis of the aggrieved person’s affidavit “under section 18, section 19, section 20, section 21 or, as the case may be, section 22” — so the text does name Section 22 among the provisions available at the interim, even ex parte, stage.
Then why is interim compensation controversial?
Because Section 22 by its own terms contemplates compensation “for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by that respondent” — language that presupposes a finding that domestic violence was committed. Assessing damages for injury ordinarily requires adjudication, not a prima facie glance. The tension is between Section 23(2)’s broad text and Section 22’s adjudicatory character.
How do courts practically resolve the tension?
The dominant practice is to grant genuinely compensatory sums only at the final stage, while meeting the aggrieved person’s immediate needs through Section 20 interim monetary relief — which expressly covers loss of earnings, medical expenses, and losses caused by the violence. Courts are far more comfortable labelling interim money as Section 20 relief than as Section 22 compensation.
How should an applicant frame the interim prayer?
Lead with Section 20: itemise the actual, ongoing monetary consequences of the violence — treatment costs, destroyed belongings, lost income, rent. Reserve Section 22 for final relief, pleading the injury case fully so the compensation claim matures with the evidence. A prayer that asks the Magistrate to quantify emotional-distress damages on affidavits alone invites rejection and an appealable vulnerability.