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Home › Commercial Appeal: Take-Down Scope
Delhi High Court · 5 November 2026

Remove What, Exactly? An Intermediary Pushes Back on a Vague Take-Down Direction

In IndiaMART InterMESH Ltd v. Ram Avtar Chamria, FAO (COMM) 334/2026, a Division Bench of Justices Prathiba M. Singh and Dinesh Bhatt declined to decide the merits of a family-settlement injunction, but recognised that a platform cannot be left to police listings without identified URLs — and gave it liberty to seek clarification from the Commercial Court.

When a court restrains a trader from selling in certain territories, what must the e-commerce platform that hosts his listings do about it? On 5 November 2026, in IndiaMART InterMESH Ltd v. Ram Avtar Chamria & Ors (FAO (COMM) 334/2026), the Delhi High Court dealt with a platform’s appeal against a Section 9 interim order that had directed it to block deliveries and remove “infringing listings” — without telling it which ones. The Division Bench’s answer is a practical blueprint: the intermediary’s remedy for an ambiguous take-down direction is a clarification application, not an appeal on the merits of someone else’s dispute.

A family deed, territories, and e-commerce

The underlying proceedings began as a Section 9 petition under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, filed by Ram Avtar Chamria and Rakesh Chamria against Kamal Kumar Chamria and others. The petitioners relied on a family settlement of 24 January 1998 assigning territories for the sale of products, and alleged that the respondent was violating that division by selling through e-commerce listings reaching the reserved territories.

By an order of 16 September 2026 in OMP(I)(COMM) No. 2856/2026, the District Judge (Commercial), Dwarka Courts, partly allowed the petition. The order restrained the respondent from selling deed-covered products in the named territories — and went further: it directed IndiaMART and other platforms to take reasonable steps to block delivery of identified products to those territories, to remove infringing listings promptly, and not to delist the respondent’s entire catalogue.

The intermediary’s dilemma

IndiaMART appealed under Section 37(1)(b) of the Arbitration Act read with Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Its grievance was not with the injunction between the family members; it was with what the order asked of the platform. No URLs were identified. No specific products were listed. The direction to remove “infringing listings” therefore required the intermediary to decide, listing by listing, what infringed a family settlement it is not party to — a merits determination that belongs to the court, not the platform.

The order as framed. Block deliveries of covered products to the reserved territories and promptly remove infringing listings — with no schedule of URLs or products to work from.
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The workable model. The claimant identifies the specific listings; the platform removes what is identified. The adjudication of infringement stays with the court, the execution with the intermediary.

What the Division Bench held

The Bench of Justices Prathiba M. Singh and Dinesh Bhatt declined to decide the merits of the injunction — IndiaMART, whose only role is to remove and delist, could not make submissions on them, and the restrained party was unrepresented. The Court referred to Metro Shoes Ltd v. Tolexo Online (P) Ltd, where an intermediary portal was directed to furnish vendor details rather than police the platform, and to Happi Planet Eco Products (P) Ltd v. Ravi Malani on dynamic injunctions under which a plaintiff may send infringing listings directly to platforms for removal. It noted that the usual course is for courts to direct the plaintiff to furnish the list of links to be taken down.

Because the scope of the take-down obligation in the Dwarka order was ambiguous, the Bench held that IndiaMART’s concern could be met by the Commercial Court itself: the appeal was disposed of with liberty to approach that court for clarification or modification, and all pending applications were closed.

Practice pointers

For claimants: when interim relief touches online listings, annex the URLs or product identifiers and build into the order a mechanism for notifying future listings. A direction the platform cannot execute precisely is a direction that invites satellite litigation.

For platforms: an ambiguous take-down direction is challengeable, but the efficient remedy is a clarification or modification application before the issuing court. The appellate court in this case consciously channelled the intermediary back to that forum.

For respondents in Section 9 proceedings: interim orders can reach non-signatory platforms as instruments of enforcement; opposing overbroad platform directions at the first hearing is easier than unwinding them later.

This article describes an appellate order of the Delhi High Court for general information. The merits of the underlying family dispute remain pending and were expressly left undecided by the Division Bench.

Frequently Asked Questions

What was the underlying dispute about?

Two family members invoked Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act against a third, relying on a family deed of 24 January 1998 that assigns territories for product sales. They alleged the respondent was violating the territorial division through e-commerce listings. The District Judge, Dwarka, partly allowed the petition, restraining sales in the named territories and directing platforms to block deliveries there.

Why did IndiaMART appeal rather than the restrained party?

The interim order directed IndiaMART to take reasonable steps to block delivery of identified products and to remove infringing listings promptly. IndiaMART argued this placed an undue burden on it, because the order did not identify URLs or specific products, effectively asking an intermediary to adjudicate what infringes — a merits question it is in no position to decide.

What did the High Court decide?

It declined to examine the merits of the injunction, observing that IndiaMART’s only role is to remove and delist infringing listings. Noting that courts usually have the plaintiff furnish the list of links to be removed, the Bench disposed of the appeal with liberty to IndiaMART to approach the Commercial Court for clarification or modification of the ambiguous direction.

What is the practical lesson for platforms and litigants?

Parties seeking take-down relief should identify specific listings or URLs, and orders should require the claimant to supply them. Platforms served with open-ended directions should move the issuing court for clarification rather than attempting to self-adjudicate infringement, and appellate courts will channel them back to that remedy.

Note: This article is general information about the law and is not legal advice. It does not create an advocate-client relationship. The position stated is as at 16 November 2026 and may have changed since. Readers should verify any provision or decision referred to against the official text and seek advice on their own circumstances.