Most contested divorces under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 are fought on cruelty or desertion, and this site has examined both in earlier explainers. But Section 13(1) contains a longer catalogue. A spouse who has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion, who suffers incurable unsoundness of mind of a degree that makes cohabitation unreasonable, who has renounced the world by entering a religious order, or who has not been heard of as alive for seven years — each gives the other spouse a distinct route to dissolution. These grounds carry their own definitions, their own proof requirements, and their own traps.
The catalogue beyond cruelty and desertion
| Ground | Provision | Core requirement |
|---|---|---|
| Conversion | S. 13(1)(ii) | Respondent has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion |
| Unsound mind / mental disorder | S. 13(1)(iii) | Incurable unsoundness, or mental disorder such that cohabitation cannot reasonably be expected |
| Virulent and incurable leprosy | Former S. 13(1)(iv) | Omitted by the Personal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019 — no longer a ground |
| Venereal disease | S. 13(1)(v) | Communicable form of venereal disease |
| Renunciation | S. 13(1)(vi) | Renounced the world by entering a religious order |
| Presumed death | S. 13(1)(vii) | Not heard of as alive for seven years by those who would naturally hear |
One entry deserves immediate emphasis: leprosy was deleted as a matrimonial ground by the Personal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019, across the HMA and other personal law statutes. Petitions still occasionally plead it; they are misconceived.
Conversion: an option, not an escape hatch
Section 13(1)(ii) is available to the spouse who has not converted. The design is protective: the marriage was solemnised between two Hindus under Hindu law, and if one abandons that religion, the other may elect to end the marriage. The converting spouse gains nothing matrimonially by converting — the first marriage subsists until dissolved by a court, and a second marriage contracted on the strength of conversion is void and prosecutable as bigamy. Proof usually turns on documents or conduct evidencing a genuine, formal adoption of another faith, not mere heterodoxy or attendance at another community's worship.
Mental disorder: the degree test
The ground under Section 13(1)(iii) is the most litigated of this group and the most frequently misapplied. The statute does not permit divorce merely because a spouse has a psychiatric diagnosis. The explanation defines mental disorder widely — mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder — but the operative test is one of degree: the disorder must be of such a kind and extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. Courts therefore look for concrete evidence of how the condition manifests in the marriage, supported by medical records and, commonly, court-directed examination. Petitions built on stray prescriptions or on stigma rather than substance fail, and deserve to.
Renunciation of the world
Section 13(1)(vi) reflects a distinctly Indian circumstance: entry into a religious order — sanyas — is a civil death of sorts, and the remaining spouse is not condemned to a marriage with a renunciate. The proof is of formal entry into the order according to its rites and ceremonies, together with the renunciation of worldly affairs. The ground is rare in Delhi's Family Courts, but it is pleaded, and when it is, the evidence must come from the order's practices — tonsure, initiation, the assumption of robes and a monastic name — not merely from the spouse's absence from the household.
Seven years unheard of
Section 13(1)(vii) borrows the evidentiary presumption of death — now housed in Section 111 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, formerly Section 108 of the Evidence Act — and converts it into a matrimonial remedy. The petitioner must show that the respondent has not been heard of as being alive for seven years or more by the persons who would naturally have heard: parents, siblings, children, close associates. The advantage of a decree over the bare presumption is finality. If a spouse simply presumed dead reappears, the presumption collapses; but a decree of divorce under this clause stands, and a remarriage contracted after it remains valid.
Practice note: These grounds frequently overlap with others — a renunciate spouse has usually also deserted; a conversion is often accompanied by conduct amounting to cruelty. Sound pleading raises the specific statutory ground and the overlapping general ones in the alternative, so that the decree does not stand or fall on a single characterisation.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does conversion by itself dissolve the marriage?
No. Conversion of a spouse to another religion does not dissolve a Hindu marriage automatically. It gives the non-converting spouse the option to petition for divorce under Section 13(1)(ii). The converting spouse cannot rely on his or her own conversion to escape the marriage or to contract another one — a second marriage during the subsistence of the first remains bigamous.
What must be proved for divorce on the ground of unsound mind?
Section 13(1)(iii) requires that the respondent has been incurably of unsound mind, or has suffered continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. Medical evidence is indispensable, and courts insist on the degree test — a diagnosis alone, without impact on cohabitation, does not suffice.
What counts as "renouncing the world" under Section 13(1)(vi)?
Two elements: renunciation of worldly life and formal entry into a religious order in accordance with the rites of that order — becoming a sanyasi, for example. Informal religiosity, extended pilgrimage or neglect of the household through devotion does not meet the ground, though it may be relevant to desertion or cruelty.
How does the seven-year presumption of death work in divorce?
Under Section 13(1)(vii), a spouse may seek divorce where the other has not been heard of as being alive for seven years or more by persons who would naturally have heard of him or her. The decree protects the petitioner even if the missing spouse later reappears: the marriage stands dissolved from the decree, unlike a bare presumption of death, which reappearance can rebut.