In Anjali Devi v. Shashi Kumar Pandey (First Appeal No. 218 of 2026, 2026:JHHC:32560-DB, pronounced 5 November 2026), a Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand allowed a wife’s appeal and quashed an ex parte decree of divorce that the Family Court, Koderma had granted on the footing that she suffered from psychiatric conditions and refused medication. The husband had examined no doctor and produced no cogent medical evidence. The judgment is a strong restatement that even in ex parte proceedings, the petitioner must strictly prove the matrimonial ground — a Family Court cannot grant a decree mechanically.
The case in one view
| Case | Anjali Devi v. Shashi Kumar Pandey, First Appeal No. 218 of 2026 (2026:JHHC:32560-DB) |
|---|---|
| Bench | Sujit Narayan Prasad and Akhil Kumar, JJ., High Court of Jharkhand |
| Pronounced | 5 November 2026 (reserved 29 September 2026) |
| Provisions | Sections 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(iii), Hindu Marriage Act; Section 19, Family Courts Act |
| Outcome | Appeal allowed; ex parte decree of divorce quashed |
The background
The parties married in 2019. The husband’s petition alleged that the wife quarrelled with his mother, left the matrimonial home within a month, and had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and a seizure disorder, which she refused to treat; village panchayats were said to have failed. He sued for divorce before the Family Court, Koderma. The wife did not appear, and in January 2026 the Family Court granted an ex parte decree of divorce on the testimony of three witnesses, including the husband himself — without any medical records of substance and without examining any treating doctor.
In appeal, the wife alleged dowry demands, assault, ouster from the matrimonial home and the taking of her stridhan, and pointed to a pending maintenance case at Dhanbad.
A medical label cannot carry a decree
The Division Bench’s analysis begins with Ram Narain Gupta v. Rameshwari Gupta: a psychiatric diagnosis, even if established, does not by itself dissolve a marriage. The statutory ground under Section 13(1)(iii) demands a disorder of a kind and degree making cohabitation unreasonable, and the decree under challenge had in substance treated the illness narrative as cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia). The entire foundation was the husband’s say-so about diagnosis and medication refusal.
From the judgment: “Mental illness cannot, by itself, be made a ground for stigmatizing a spouse or dissolving the marriage.” The court added that “the absence of any cogent medical evidence assumes significance in the facts of the present case”.
Ex parte does not mean automatic
The second — and for daily practice, the more important — strand of the judgment concerns the Family Court’s duty when the respondent is absent. An ex parte proceeding relieves the petitioner of cross-examination, not of proof. The ground pleaded must still be strictly established; the court must still test the evidence against the statute; and a decree that rests on an evidentiary vacuum is perverse. On that reasoning the Division Bench quashed the decree.
What the decision means in practice
The wider frame
Allegations of psychiatric illness appear in a significant share of contested divorces, and they carry a stigmatising force that outlasts the litigation. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence — from Ram Narain Gupta onward — has consistently required courts to look past labels to degree, consequence and proof. This judgment applies that discipline at the point where it is most often relaxed: the undefended case. For the practitioner, the lesson is symmetrical. The petitioner who treats an absent respondent as a shortcut invites reversal; the respondent who ignores summons forfeits the trial but not, ultimately, the law’s insistence on proof.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can divorce be granted because a spouse has a mental illness?
Not on the label alone. Following Ram Narain Gupta v. Rameshwari Gupta, the court reiterated that a medical diagnosis by itself cannot justify dissolution of marriage; under Section 13(1)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act the disorder must be of a kind and degree that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent, and here the decree had in fact been rested on cruelty without proof.
Does refusing medication amount to cruelty?
The court held that refusing treatment does not automatically amount to cruelty. The finding of mental cruelty in this case rested solely on the husband's own assertions about medication refusal, with the treating doctor never examined — an evidentiary foundation the Division Bench found wholly inadequate.
Is the burden of proof lighter when the respondent does not appear?
No. The court held that even in ex parte proceedings the petitioner must strictly prove the ground pleaded. Unchallenged testimony must still be tested against the statutory requirements, and a decree that ignores the absence of essential evidence — here, medical evidence — is perverse and liable to be set aside in appeal.
What happens after the decree is set aside?
The parties revert to the position before the decree: the marriage subsists and the divorce petition stands restored for a proper adjudication. The wife's own allegations — dowry demands, assault and retention of stridhan, along with a pending maintenance case — remain to be considered in the appropriate proceedings.