In Smt Pradeep Kaur v. Harvinder Singh Khurana, C.R.P. 320/2025 (reserved 18 August 2026, pronounced 27 October 2026), the Delhi High Court dismissed a challenge to a Family Court order declining to recall a divorce decree of 8 February 2019. Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar held that the wife — whose right to lead evidence was closed in December 2018 after she stopped appearing, and whose recall application came 73 days late — could not use a recall application, revision or Article 227 to reopen a decree against which the statute provided a thirty-day appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 that she never pursued.
A marriage of 1992, a petition of 2006, a decree of 2019
The parties married in 1992. The husband sought divorce on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act in 2006. The litigation moved slowly until late 2018, when the wife stopped attending the Family Court. On 10 December 2018 her right to lead evidence was closed, the matter proceeded to final arguments, and on 8 February 2019 the marriage was dissolved — the parties disputing to the end whether the decision was truly ex parte or one rendered on merits.
On 23 May 2019, seventy-three days out of time, the wife applied to recall the decree, citing medical conditions and her engagement in a parallel criminal case. Six years later, on 11 July 2025, the Family Court condoned the delay and held the application maintainable, but dismissed it on merits — noting that in the same period she claimed incapacity, she had regularly attended proceedings before a Metropolitan Magistrate in the same complex.
The High Court's reasoning
| Challenge | Outcome |
|---|---|
| Against the 11 July 2025 order refusing recall | No jurisdictional error, material irregularity or perversity; the High Court will not re-appreciate evidence in supervisory or revisional jurisdiction |
| Against the decree of 8 February 2019 itself | Not entertained — the statutory appeal under Section 19, Family Courts Act was available for thirty days and never filed; recall and Article 227 cannot circumvent that limitation |
| Allegations of fraud | Unsupported by findings or foundational facts; insufficient to reopen the decree |
The Court anchored the second holding in Mohamed Ali v. V. Jaya (2022): where the legislature has provided an appeal, the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is not a parallel, timetable-free substitute. The architecture of matrimonial litigation depends on that discipline — a decree of divorce changes legal status, and third parties (including subsequent spouses) order their lives around its finality.
The lessons on both sides of the aisle
For respondents in matrimonial litigation, the case is a stark illustration of how absence compounds. Each stage — the closure of evidence, the decree, the appeal window — passed without challenge, and by the time the attack came, the only available target was the recall order, reviewed on the narrow standard of perversity. A party who cannot attend must say so immediately, by application with medical or other proof, not years later; and a party who learns of an adverse decree has thirty days that matter more than any argument.
For decree-holders, the judgment reinforces the value of a clean procedural record. The Family Court here had closed evidence by a reasoned order, and the recall was decided after condoning delay and hearing the merits — leaving no procedural grievance for the High Court to seize upon. Finality, in matrimonial law as elsewhere, is built stage by stage.
Practice note: The dismissal does not leave a genuinely aggrieved party remediless in every case — a decree obtained by proved fraud can be assailed — but the burden of pleading and establishing fraud is heavy and specific. What the law does not permit is the conversion of inaction into a ground of challenge.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the remedy against an ex parte divorce decree?
Two routes exist: an application to the Family Court itself to set aside or recall the decree, showing sufficient cause for the absence, and the statutory appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act within thirty days. The appeal is the complete remedy on merits; the recall route depends on proving a genuine inability to appear.
Why did the recall application fail here?
The Family Court condoned the 73-day delay and examined the application on merits, but found no sufficient cause: during the very period the wife claimed she could not attend, she was regularly appearing before a Metropolitan Magistrate in the same court complex. The High Court found nothing perverse in that assessment.
Can Article 227 be used when the appeal period has expired?
Ordinarily not. Relying on Mohamed Ali v. V. Jaya (2022), the Court held that supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 generally cannot substitute for an available statutory appeal — otherwise limitation under Section 19 would be meaningless.
Do allegations of fraud reopen a decree automatically?
No. Fraud must be pleaded with foundational facts and established; a bare allegation, unsupported by any finding, does not dissolve the finality of a decree.