In Arzoo Samarth Jagnani v. Smarth Vimal Jagnani (Crl.A. No. 320/2025, decided 3 November 2026), the LXVI Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, allowed a wife’s appeal under Section 29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, set aside the dismissal of her Section 12 petition, and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. The judgment is a careful restatement of two points that recur in Delhi’s district courts as much as in Bengaluru’s: domestic violence must be assessed strictly within the categories of Section 3 of the Act, and covert audio recordings are not inadmissible merely because they were made secretly.
The case in one view
| Case | Arzoo Samarth Jagnani v. Smarth Vimal Jagnani & Ors., Crl.A. No. 320/2025 |
|---|---|
| Court | Sri Jayaprakash A., LXVI Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City (DV appellate court) |
| Decided | 3 November 2026 |
| Provisions | Sections 3, 12, 18, 19, 20, 22 and 29, DV Act, 2005; Section 65-B, Evidence Act |
| Outcome | Appeal allowed; dismissal set aside; matter remitted for fresh consideration |
The background
The parties married in Mumbai in June 2014. The wife’s Section 12 petition alleged taunts over wedding expenditure said to run to about Rs 1.27 crore, physical intimidation, verbal and emotional abuse, restrictions on her career, retention of stridhan and financial deprivation, and asserted that she was forced out of the matrimonial home in July 2015. The husband and his family denied the allegations entirely, contending that she left of her own accord and that the DV petition was a pressure tactic in the parties’ pending matrimonial litigation.
The Magistrate dismissed the petition in January 2025. The wife appealed under Section 29 of the Act.
Section 3 supplies the yardstick
The appellate court’s central criticism of the trial order was that it tested the wife’s allegations against the standards of matrimonial cruelty familiar from divorce law, rather than against the statutory definition. Section 3 of the DV Act defines domestic violence through specific categories — physical, sexual, verbal, emotional and economic abuse — and the conduct alleged must be measured against those categories, cumulatively rather than incident by incident.
From the judgment: “The determination of domestic violence must be made strictly in accordance with Section 3 of the D.V. Act.”
The court drew on the settled Supreme Court line on the Act’s protective architecture, including Hiral P. Harsora, Prabha Tyagi, V.D. Bhanot, Satish Chander Ahuja and Krishna Bhattacharjee.
Secret recordings: admissibility versus weight
The wife relied on audio recordings made without the husband’s knowledge. The appellate court held that covert recording does not by itself render the material inadmissible, but the recordings, being electronic records, must be proved in the manner required by Section 65-B of the Evidence Act, in line with Anvar P.V. and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar. The court was equally clear about the converse:
From the judgment: “A recording which is inadmissible cannot be relied upon to establish an allegation.”
The discipline the judgment asks for is the separation of two questions that are often blurred in practice: whether the recording can be looked at, and how much it proves once it is.
Economic abuse and the finances of both sides
The Magistrate had treated the wife’s employment history as answering the economic-abuse allegation. The appellate court disagreed: employment does not conclusively negate economic abuse, just as the husband’s income does not automatically entitle the aggrieved person to monetary relief. Both parties’ financial positions require proper assessment, and the court permitted updated affidavits of assets of the kind standardised in Rajnesh v. Neha.
What the decision means in practice
The wider frame
Although the decision comes from a Bengaluru appellate court, the propositions it applies are drawn from Supreme Court authority that binds proceedings everywhere, including before the Mahila Courts and Sessions Courts of Delhi. DV petitions are frequently fought, and sometimes dismissed, on an implicit comparison with the high threshold of matrimonial cruelty. The judgment is a useful, recent reminder that the DV Act carries its own definitions, its own reliefs under Sections 18 to 22, and its own evidentiary discipline for electronic records.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is the test for domestic violence the same as cruelty in divorce cases?
No. The appellate court held that the determination must be made strictly in accordance with Section 3 of the DV Act, which defines physical, sexual, verbal, emotional and economic abuse, assessed cumulatively. Importing the standards of matrimonial cruelty developed under divorce law into DV proceedings is an error of approach that can vitiate the order.
Are secret recordings admissible in DV proceedings?
The court held that audio recordings are not inadmissible merely because they were made covertly, but electronic records must be proved in accordance with Section 65-B of the Evidence Act, following Anvar P.V. and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar. Admissibility is a distinct question from the weight ultimately given to the recording.
Does a wife's employment history defeat a claim of economic abuse?
Not by itself. The court held that the wife's employment record did not conclusively disprove economic abuse, just as the husband's income did not automatically entitle her to monetary relief. Both parties' financial positions must be properly assessed, and updated affidavits of the kind contemplated in Rajnesh v. Neha were permitted on remand.
What happens after a remand in a DV appeal?
The matter returns to the Magistrate for fresh consideration on the specific issues framed by the appellate court. The parties in this case were directed to appear before the trial court, and the earlier dismissal no longer stands. A remand is not a finding that domestic violence occurred; it means the petition must be decided again by the correct legal standards.