Matrimonial litigation rarely travels in a single file. A wife’s complaint under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act sat before the Magistrate at Gurugram; a maintenance petition between the same parties was pending before the Family Court in the same city. The husband asked for both to be heard together. On 12 November 2026, in Ashutosh Mittal v. Punita Mittal (TA No. 24 of 2026), Justice Mandeep Pannu of the Punjab & Haryana High Court dismissed the transfer application — holding that convenience cannot rewrite the statutory allocation of forums.
The transfer plea
The husband’s application invoked Section 24 read with Section 151 CPC, seeking transfer of DV Case No. 139/2025 — the wife’s application under Section 12 of the 2005 Act — from the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gurugram to the Family Court, Gurugram. The logic was familiar: the same spouses, overlapping allegations, common evidence, and the spectre of two courts reaching inconsistent findings on the same marriage. Since Section 26 of the DV Act allows DV reliefs to be granted by a Family Court, why not let one judge hear everything?
The statutory architecture
| Provision | What it actually does |
|---|---|
| Section 12, DV Act | The aggrieved person’s substantive application for reliefs — presented to the Magistrate. |
| Section 27, DV Act | Designates the Judicial Magistrate First Class (or Metropolitan Magistrate) as the competent court for Section 12 applications. |
| Section 26, DV Act | Permits reliefs under Sections 18–22 to be sought in addition, in any legal proceeding already pending before a civil court, Family Court or criminal court. |
| Section 7(2)(a), Family Courts Act | Gives Family Courts the jurisdiction of a Magistrate under Chapter IX CrPC — maintenance — and nothing wider on the criminal side. |
What the court held
The order aligned itself with the Kerala Division Bench and Delhi High Court decisions taking the same view of Section 26, declined to follow the contrary Bombay approach, and discussed the Supreme Court’s 2025 exposition of the DV Act’s scheme (Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 INSC 734) — all as recorded in the order itself.
Why this matters in daily practice
Frequently Asked Questions
What exactly did the husband seek?
Transfer of the wife's DV case under Section 12 from the Judicial Magistrate to the Family Court where a Section 125 CrPC maintenance petition between the same parties was pending — citing overlapping evidence, multiplicity of proceedings and the risk of conflicting findings, and arguing that Section 26 of the DV Act lets the Family Court grant DV reliefs in any event.
Why did Section 26 not help?
Because Section 26 only permits reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 to be claimed in proceedings already pending before a civil court, family court or criminal court. It is an enabling provision for adding DV reliefs to existing litigation; it does not vest the Family Court with original jurisdiction to entertain an independent Section 12 application, which Section 27 reserves to the Magistrate.
Does a pending maintenance case ever justify such a transfer?
On this reasoning, no. The court held that the mere pendency of a maintenance petition does not confer jurisdiction on the Family Court over a Section 12 application, and that common parties or overlapping allegations are not grounds for transfer. The Family Courts Act confers only Chapter IX CrPC maintenance jurisdiction on Family Courts through Section 7(2)(a).
What should parties facing parallel proceedings do instead?
Manage the overlap rather than fight the forum: seek coordinated hearing dates, place each court's orders on the record of the other, rely on the rule against double maintenance for adjustment of amounts, and use consolidated settlement discussions. The statutory forums remain separate, but duplication of evidence can be reduced by disciplined disclosure in both.