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Home › Divorce Appeal Dismissed
Jharkhand High Court · 11 September 2026

Cruelty Must Be Proved, Desertion Must Be Wilful: Divorce Appeal Dismissed

A Division Bench affirmed the Family Court's refusal of divorce under the Special Marriage Act, finding neither specific instances of cruelty nor animus deserendi on the wife's part.

In Anshuman Sharma v. Sathi Bhandari (F.A. No. 292 of 2023, decided on 11 September 2026), a Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand dismissed a husband's first appeal against the Family Court's refusal to dissolve his marriage. The husband had sought divorce under Section 27(1)(b) and (d) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 — desertion and cruelty — after the wife left the matrimonial home in August 2017. The Bench of Sujit Narayan Prasad and Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, JJ. held that the grounds were not made out on the evidence, and that a wife's separation driven by compelling circumstances, coupled with her stated willingness to resume conjugal life, is not desertion in law.

The Background

The parties were married under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, and a child was born from the marriage. According to the husband — who was posted with a paramilitary force and remained away from home for long stretches — the wife left the matrimonial home on 17 August 2017 and did not return. He filed a suit for divorce before the Family Court on two grounds available under Section 27(1) of the Act: desertion under clause (b) and cruelty under clause (d).

The wife contested the petition. Her case was that the separation was not of her choosing but the result of the circumstances she faced in the matrimonial home, and she stated in clear terms that she remained willing to resume conjugal life with her husband. The Family Court believed her, dismissed the divorce petition, and the husband carried the matter to the High Court in first appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

What the Division Bench Held

The Division Bench of Sujit Narayan Prasad and Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, JJ. dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decree of the Family Court. Three strands run through the judgment.

Cruelty — no specific instances proved. The husband\'s allegations remained at the level of generalised grievance. The Court found that he failed to prove specific instances of cruelty through evidence, and a matrimonial court cannot dissolve a marriage on impressions.
Desertion — no animus deserendi. The wife\'s departure from the matrimonial home was found to flow from compelling circumstances rather than from any intention to abandon the marriage. Separation in fact, without the intention to forsake the relationship permanently, is not desertion.
Willingness to cohabit. The wife had consistently expressed willingness to resume conjugal life. That stance cut at the root of both grounds — it negated the intention to desert and undermined the claim that the marriage had been wrecked by her conduct.

The Two Grounds, Side by Side

GroundProvision (SMA, 1954)What must be shown
DesertionSection 27(1)(b)Separation in fact, intention to forsake the marriage, absence of reasonable cause and of consent, for the statutory period
CrueltySection 27(1)(d)Conduct, proved by evidence of specific instances, making it unreasonable to expect the petitioner to live with the respondent

The appellate court\'s approach deserves attention: it did not re-try the marriage. It asked whether the Family Court\'s findings were supported by the evidence and legally sound — and, finding that they were, it declined to interfere. First appeals in matrimonial cases succeed on demonstrated error, not on repetition of the trial narrative.

Why the Judgment Matters

Petitions pleading cruelty and desertion together are the workhorses of contested divorce litigation, and this decision restates the discipline that both grounds demand. Cruelty is a fact to be proved, incident by incident, through cogent evidence; pleadings that speak only of temperament and general unhappiness will not survive trial. Desertion is equally exacting: the law looks for the mental element — the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end — and attributes weight to the conduct of the spouse said to be the deserter. A spouse who left under pressure of circumstances and who tells the court she is ready to return is, in the eye of the law, not a deserter.

The decision also illustrates a recurring feature of service and paramilitary marriages, where long postings keep couples apart. Physical distance generated by employment is not matrimonial separation, and courts are careful not to let the geography of a posting be dressed up as desertion by either side.

For petitioners, the practical lesson is to plead and prove particulars: dates, incidents, witnesses and contemporaneous material. For respondents resisting a divorce, a genuine, recorded willingness to resume cohabitation remains one of the weightiest answers to a desertion plea. And for both sides, the appeal stage is not a second trial — findings of fact recorded by a Family Court on a proper appreciation of evidence are seldom disturbed.

This article is for general information only and is not legal advice or a solicitation. The judgment should be read in full from the official record.

Frequently Asked Questions

What must a spouse prove to obtain divorce on the ground of cruelty?

Specific instances of conduct, established by evidence, that caused reasonable apprehension of harm or made cohabitation intolerable. Vague, generalised grievances do not suffice. In this appeal the husband's cruelty case failed precisely because particular incidents were not proved through evidence before the Family Court.

When does living separately amount to desertion?

Desertion requires both separation in fact and the intention to permanently forsake the marriage (animus deserendi), without reasonable cause and without consent, for the statutory period. Where the spouse left because of compelling circumstances and remains willing to resume cohabitation, the intention to desert is absent and the ground fails.

Does the Special Marriage Act govern divorce for couples married under it?

Yes. Couples married under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 seek matrimonial reliefs under that Act — Section 27 lists the divorce grounds, including desertion under Section 27(1)(b) and cruelty under Section 27(1)(d) — rather than under the personal law that would otherwise apply to them.

How does an appellate court deal with a Family Court's findings of fact?

A first appeal is a rehearing on facts and law, but the appellate court interferes only where the trial court's findings are shown to be perverse or contrary to the evidence. Here the Division Bench found the Family Court's appreciation of the evidence legally sound and declined to disturb it.

Note: This article is general information about the law and is not legal advice. It does not create an advocate-client relationship. The position stated is as at 15 September 2026 and may have changed since. Readers should verify any provision or decision referred to against the official text and seek advice on their own circumstances.