Most orders under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are civil in nature: they regulate residence, money and custody between parties in a domestic relationship. Section 31 is the statute's enforcement spine. It provides that a breach of a protection order, or of an interim protection order, by the respondent is an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year, or with fine up to twenty thousand rupees, or both. This explainer covers what the offence requires, how it is investigated and tried, and what both sides should know about arrest, bail and defence.
Why Section 31 matters
A protection order under Section 18 restrains the respondent from committing acts of domestic violence, from entering specified places, from communicating with the aggrieved person, from alienating assets, and from other conduct the Magistrate specifies. Without a penal consequence, such an order would depend entirely on the respondent's goodwill. Section 31 supplies the consequence: violation is itself a fresh offence, independent of any offence the underlying conduct may constitute under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
Ingredients of the offence
- A subsisting protection order — final under Section 18 or interim under Section 23 — validly passed and in force on the date of the alleged breach;
- Knowledge of the order on the respondent's part, which service of the order establishes;
- An act or omission violating the specific terms of that order; and
- Commission of the breach by the respondent against whom the order operates.
Precision matters on the third element. The prosecution must map the conduct alleged to a specific clause of the order. Conduct that is objectionable but outside the order's terms may be domestic violence justifying fresh reliefs, yet not a Section 31 offence.
Procedure: from complaint to trial
Points for the defence
Three lines of defence recur in practice. First, the order itself: if the protection order had expired, been vacated, or been stayed in appeal under Section 29 on the date of the alleged breach, the substratum of the offence disappears. Second, service and knowledge: a respondent who was never served with the interim order and had no notice of its terms cannot readily be attributed the culpable breach the section contemplates. Third, the mapping question: monetary defaults and disputes about residence rights are frequently pressed as Section 31 breaches when they are, on the order's actual text, matters for enforcement under Sections 20 and 25 or execution as a civil direction. None of this dilutes the seriousness of genuine violations; it disciplines the charge to what the statute punishes.
Practice note: For the aggrieved person, the working documents are the certified copy of the protection order, proof of its service, and contemporaneous evidence of the breach — call records, photographs, CCTV requests, and a promptly lodged complaint. Delay in reporting a breach is not fatal, but immediate reporting forecloses the argument that the incident is an afterthought.
Interaction with the BNSS
The DV Act cross-refers to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. With the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 in force since 1 July 2024, those references are read as references to the corresponding BNSS provisions by virtue of the repeal-and-savings scheme. Arrest, remand, bail and trial in a Section 31 case are therefore governed by the BNSS framework — for bail, the discretionary regime under Section 480 BNSS (formerly Section 437 CrPC) before the Magistrate, with the Sessions Court and High Court exercising powers under Section 483 BNSS (formerly Section 439 CrPC).
The takeaway
Section 31 is what gives a protection order its teeth. For an aggrieved person, it means that violation of the order is not merely contempt of a civil direction but a cognizable offence on which the police must act. For a respondent, it means a protection order must be treated with the same seriousness as an injunction backed by penal sanction: challenge it in appeal if it is wrong, seek its modification if circumstances change, but never simply ignore it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is breach of every DV Act order an offence under Section 31?
Section 31 speaks of breach of a protection order or an interim protection order — that is, orders under Section 18 and interim orders of that character under Section 23. Breach of purely monetary directions is ordinarily enforced through the Act's civil enforcement machinery rather than Section 31, so identifying precisely which order was breached is the first step in any complaint or defence.
Is the offence bailable?
No. Section 32(1) declares the offence under Section 31(1) to be cognizable and non-bailable. Bail is therefore a matter of judicial discretion, not of right, although given the one-year maximum sentence courts frequently grant bail on conditions designed to secure compliance with the underlying protection order.
Can the aggrieved person's testimony alone sustain a conviction?
Yes. Section 32(2) provides that the court may conclude that the offence has been committed upon the sole testimony of the aggrieved person, if it inspires confidence. Corroboration strengthens the case but is not a legal requirement.
Which court tries the offence?
Section 31(2) directs that the offence be tried, as far as practicable, by the Magistrate who passed the order said to have been breached. This keeps enforcement before the court most familiar with the history of the case. Charges under other statutes — such as offences under the BNS — can be framed in the same trial where the facts disclose them.