In Sudeep Arun Upadhyay v. State of Delhi (BAIL APPLN. 2735/2026, decided 3 November 2026), Justice Mini Pushkarna of the High Court of Delhi dismissed a regular bail application under Section 483 of the BNSS in a case under Section 376 IPC and Section 10 of the POCSO Act. The decisive factor was timing: the trial has commenced, and the complainant’s examination is ongoing. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in X v. State of Rajasthan and Neeru Yadav, the court held that once trial begins — especially while the victim’s testimony is being recorded — courts should be reluctant to grant bail in serious offences.
The case in one view
| Case | Sudeep Arun Upadhyay v. State of Delhi, BAIL APPLN. 2735/2026 |
|---|---|
| Court | High Court of Delhi, Mini Pushkarna J |
| Decided | 3 November 2026 |
| Provisions | Section 376 IPC; Section 10, POCSO Act; bail under Section 483 BNSS |
| Outcome | Bail application dismissed |
The background
The FIR, registered in November 2025 at PS Baba Haridas Nagar, Dwarka, alleged that the complainant was sexually assaulted and threatened, with money demanded from her, and that the abuse continued on a false promise of marriage. The chargesheet alleged conduct stretching from 2016 to 2025 and stated that the complainant was thirteen years old at the time of the first incident; the prosecution cited hotel records, bank transfers and medical records, including a terminated pregnancy.
The procedural history matters. Anticipatory bail was dismissed on 9 December 2025; the petitioner was arrested on 15 January 2026; the Fast Track Court dismissed his regular bail application on 6 February 2026; and he had interim medical bail between 30 April and 4 July 2026. By the time the High Court heard the present application, the trial was in prosecution evidence, with the complainant’s examination ongoing and the next date fixed for 10 December 2026.
The stage-of-trial principle
The court’s reasoning tracks a consistent line of Supreme Court authority. From X v. State of Rajasthan (2024), the proposition that a trial under way, particularly during the victim’s deposition, is ordinarily to be allowed to run its course:
From the judgment, quoting the Supreme Court: “Once the trial commences, it should be allowed to reach to its final conclusion which may either result in the conviction of the accused or acquittal of the accused.”
From Neeru Yadav, the discipline that bail in serious offences is not a matter of routine but of weighed discretion. Set against the gravity of the POCSO allegations and the victim’s age, the balance fell against release. The court was careful to record that its observations were prima facie, confined to the bail application.
What the decision means in practice
The wider frame
Bail jurisprudence constantly balances the presumption of innocence against the integrity of the trial process. The stage-of-trial principle is where the second interest speaks loudest: the system’s single best protection for a testifying victim — particularly a minor in a POCSO matter — is that the accused’s liberty question waits until she has finished her evidence. Delhi’s courts apply the principle with regularity, and this decision is a clear, current illustration of it, useful both to defence counsel advising on timing and to complainants’ counsel resisting mid-deposition release.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why does the stage of trial matter so much in bail?
Because the risks the bail court guards against — influencing witnesses, derailing the prosecution — are at their peak while the key witness is in the box. Quoting X v. State of Rajasthan, the court observed that once the trial commences, it should be allowed to reach its final conclusion, whether that results in conviction or acquittal.
Had the accused tried other remedies first?
Yes. Anticipatory bail was dismissed in December 2025; he was arrested in January 2026; a regular bail application before the trial court was dismissed in February 2026; and he had a spell of interim medical bail between April and July 2026. The High Court application was thus a fresh attempt after the trial had moved into prosecution evidence.
What were the allegations?
The chargesheet alleged sexual assault and threats spanning 2016 to 2025, with the complainant stated to be thirteen at the first incident, supported by hotel records, bank transfers and medical records. The court recorded that its observations were only prima facie, for deciding the bail application.
Does dismissal of this application end the matter?
No. Bail jurisprudence recognises that successive applications lie on changed circumstances — for instance, completion of the victim's testimony, material contradictions emerging in evidence, or significant delay in trial. What this order forecloses is release while the complainant's examination is actually in progress.