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Home › Article 226 Sui Generis
Supreme Court · 14 October 2026

Neither Civil Nor Criminal: The Supreme Court on Intra-Court Appeals Against Contempt Orders

A two-judge bench holds that the writ jurisdiction is a single, extraordinary jurisdiction that resists civil and criminal labels — and asks a larger bench to revisit the rule that blocks intra-court appeals by subject matter.

Whether an intra-court appeal lies against an order of a learned Single Judge often turns on a deceptively simple question: was the jurisdiction exercised civil or criminal? In Sanjay Prasad v. Madhusudan Dwivedi, 2026 INSC 1128, decided on 14 October 2026, a bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu held that the jurisdiction under Article 226 is “neither civil nor criminal, but sui generis”, doubted the correctness of Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana (2017), and directed that the question be placed before the Chief Justice of India for consideration by a larger bench.

How the question arose

The writ court at Allahabad had allowed a petition by candidates for the post of Assistant Prosecution Officer, quashing a 2020 Office Memorandum and directing that their candidature be considered. The officer concerned rejected the candidature afresh and filed a compliance affidavit in the contempt proceedings that followed. By an order of 3 September 2026, a learned Single Judge rejected that affidavit, held that the State remained obliged to act on the writ directions, required the officer to appear in person and indicated that charges could follow.

The officer’s difficulty was procedural as much as substantive. If he treated the contempt order as one passed in criminal jurisdiction, the intra-court Special Appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules appeared barred; his remedies seemed confined to a fresh writ petition or Article 136. It is this fork in the road that the Supreme Court used to examine the architecture of intra-court appeals.

What the Court held

Article 226 is one jurisdiction

The power under Article 226 is a single, original, special and extraordinary jurisdiction. Labels of “civil” and “criminal” are administrative conveniences for listing; they cannot define or divide the jurisdiction itself.

Civil contempt is sui generis

Proceedings for civil contempt are not an exercise of criminal jurisdiction. Precedents treating them as such for the purpose of barring appeals were doubted in light of later authority.

Merit-deciding orders are appealable

Applying the Chunilal Nanda line, a contempt order that decides an issue of merit or affects rights — including one rejecting a compliance affidavit and compelling compliance over again — can ground an intra-court appeal, subject to the High Court’s rules.

The disagreement with Ram Kishan Fauji

In Ram Kishan Fauji (2017), the Supreme Court had held that whether a Letters Patent appeal lies is determined by the nature of the jurisdiction invoked, traced through the subject matter of the proceedings. The present bench identified a troubling asymmetry in that approach: an unsuccessful litigant in a land or tax writ gets a second look within the High Court, while a person whose personal liberty under Article 21 is at stake may find the intra-court door closed because the underlying matter is labelled criminal. Linking the point to access to justice under Articles 14 and 21, and to the principle that appeal provisions receive an expansive construction where the language permits, the Court framed specific questions and directed the Registry to place the opinion before the Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate bench.

The operative directions

Special Appeal permitted. The appellant was allowed to file an intra-court Special Appeal within a fortnight, with the merits of the contempt order left entirely open.
Contempt stayed. The contempt proceedings before the Single Judge were stayed for two months.
Reference pending. The questions on Ram Kishan Fauji await a larger bench; no final view on its correctness was expressed beyond respectful disagreement.

Why it matters in practice

  • Check the High Court’s rules first. Intra-court appeals are creatures of Letters Patent and local rules; the Delhi High Court position on LPAs differs from Allahabad’s Special Appeals, so the maintainability analysis is always rule-specific.
  • Contempt orders are not all equal. Purely procedural directions remain non-appealable; it is the order deciding merits or affecting rights that opens the appellate route.
  • Watch the reference. If a larger bench revisits Ram Kishan Fauji, the maintainability of intra-court appeals in writs arising from criminal subject matter — a recurring question in service, PMLA and quashing-adjacent litigation — could change significantly.

For litigants before the High Court of Delhi, the immediate takeaway is modest but useful: a contempt order that in substance adjudicates rights may be tested within the High Court itself, and the broader classification debate is now squarely before a larger bench of the Supreme Court.

This article is for general information only and is not legal advice. The judgment should be read in full before being relied upon in any proceeding.

Frequently Asked Questions

What was the dispute about?

A Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, rejected an officer's compliance affidavit in contempt proceedings arising out of a service-law writ, directed his personal appearance and indicated that charges could be framed. The officer contended that no intra-court Special Appeal lay because contempt is criminal jurisdiction, and carried the question to the Supreme Court.

Is civil contempt a criminal jurisdiction?

The bench held that civil contempt is not an exercise of criminal jurisdiction. Contempt is sui generis — a class of its own. Relying on precedent including P. Mohanraj, the Court observed that older decisions treating civil contempt as criminal jurisdiction for appeal purposes may no longer be good law, which undercuts the usual objection to intra-court appeals in such matters.

When does an intra-court appeal lie against a contempt order?

Following Midnapore Peoples' Co-op. Bank v. Chunilal Nanda, an interlocutory contempt order is appealable within the High Court when it decides issues of merit or affects rights of parties, subject to the High Court's own rules. The Court identified situations where this applies, including an order that rejects a compliance affidavit and in substance compels fresh compliance.

What happens to Ram Kishan Fauji now?

The bench expressed respectful disagreement with Ram Kishan Fauji, which decides appealability by the subject matter of the writ, and framed questions for reconsideration — including whether that approach creates an artificial division within Article 226 and impairs access to justice. The reference awaits orders of the Chief Justice of India; until a larger bench rules, Ram Kishan Fauji continues to hold the field.

Note: This article is general information about the law and is not legal advice. It does not create an advocate-client relationship. The position stated is as at 22 October 2026 and may have changed since. Readers should verify any provision or decision referred to against the official text and seek advice on their own circumstances.