Most discussion of residence orders under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 focuses on the right to stay in the shared household. But the statute itself anticipates the situations where staying is the worst available option — a one-room tenement shared with hostile in-laws, a household sold mid-litigation, a matrimonial home in another city. For those cases, Section 19(1)(f) empowers the Magistrate to direct the respondent “to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require.” This article examines that clause — the least litigated but often the most practical of the residence powers.
Where clause (f) sits in the scheme
Section 19(1) arms the Magistrate with a menu of residence orders once domestic violence is found: restraining dispossession under clause (a), directing the respondent to remove himself under clause (b) — a direction that cannot be passed against a woman — restraining entry into the aggrieved person’s portion under clause (c), restraining alienation or encumbrance of the shared household under clauses (d) and (e), and, under clause (f), directing the respondent to secure alternate accommodation of the same level or to pay rent for it. The clauses are not sealed compartments; they are tools to be combined as the facts require.
| Clause of Section 19(1) | What it does |
|---|---|
| (a) | Protects possession — no dispossession or disturbance from the shared household |
| (b) | Removes the respondent from the shared household (not available against women) |
| (c) | Keeps the respondent and his relatives out of the aggrieved person’s portion |
| (d)–(e) | Freeze alienation, encumbrance and renunciation of rights in the household |
| (f) | Substitutes the household: equivalent alternate accommodation, or rent for it |
When courts reach for clause (f)
Proving “same level”
The clause’s yardstick is the standard the aggrieved person enjoyed in the shared household — which makes the evidentiary exercise concrete rather than aspirational. The application should establish the locality and classification of the shared household, its size and amenities, and the family’s pattern of living; it should then anchor the rent figure in comparable listings or a broker’s certificate for the same locality. On the other side of the ledger sits the respondent’s capacity, proved through the income affidavits that Delhi’s family and Magistrate courts now routinely require in monetary and residence relief claims. A clause (f) figure that tracks both — equivalence and capacity — survives appeal; a round number plucked from submissions does not.
Enforcement and overlap
A rent direction is enforceable like other orders under the Act: default can be pursued through the enforcement mechanisms available for monetary relief, and the order can be revisited under Section 25 when circumstances change. Two overlaps need managing. With Section 20 monetary relief, the court must avoid double counting a housing component. With proceedings under other statutes — maintenance under Section 144 of the BNSS, 2023 (formerly Section 125 CrPC), or interim maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — the set-off discipline the courts apply to parallel maintenance awards applies with equal force to rent, and full disclosure of every pending proceeding is both a tactical and an ethical necessity.
Practice pointer: plead clause (f) in the alternative from the outset. Applications often pray only for residence in the shared household, and when trial reveals the household to be unavailable or unlivable, the absence of an alternate-accommodation prayer invites avoidable amendment battles. A prayer framed as “residence in the shared household, or in the alternative, equivalent alternate accommodation or rent under Section 19(1)(f)” keeps every door open.
The clause in one sentence
Section 19(1)(f) converts the right of residence from a right to a particular roof into a right to a particular standard of shelter — and for many aggrieved persons in Delhi’s crowded joint households, that conversion is the difference between a remedy on paper and a remedy that can actually be lived in.
This article is for general information only and is not legal advice or a solicitation.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does the aggrieved person have to prove ownership rights in the shared household first?
No. The residence powers under Section 19 operate on the fact of a domestic relationship and residence in a shared household, not on title. Clause (f) in particular is designed for situations where continued residence is impractical regardless of ownership — the focus is on securing equivalent shelter, not on adjudicating property rights, which remain open to the civil court.
What does "same level of alternate accommodation" mean?
The benchmark is the standard of living the aggrieved person enjoyed in the shared household — locality, size and amenities comparable to what she had, not a bare roof. Courts assess this on evidence of how the parties actually lived, which is why photographs, rent agreements, society records and the respondent's income disclosures matter in a clause (f) claim.
Is rent under Section 19(1)(f) the same as maintenance?
They overlap but are distinct. Rent in lieu of residence secures shelter and flows from the residence order power; monetary relief under Section 20 covers maintenance, medical expenses and loss of earnings. A Magistrate can grant both, but courts guard against double counting — if maintenance already includes a housing component, the rent order will be calibrated accordingly.
Can such an order be changed later?
Yes. Under Section 25 of the Act, orders may be altered, modified or revoked on a change in circumstances — for instance, if the respondent's finances collapse, the aggrieved person secures independent accommodation, or the shared household again becomes available. Either side may apply, and the order operates prospectively.